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INTERNATIONAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND
REVISED UCC ARTICLE 9
NEIL B. COHEN*
EDWIN E. SMITH**
Current Article 91 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "UCC"
or the "Code") is primarily concerned with domestic secured
transactions. Revised Article 92 has not varied that focus, but
particular effort was made in the drafting process to accommodate
international transactions and to minimize any statutory impediments
to them. Several factors caused the drafters to pay increased attention
to the international aspects of Revised Article 9. Two of these factors
were particularly persuasive. First, there has been a dramatic increase
in the globalization of credit3 since the promulgation of the original
Article 9.4 Second, since the original promulgation of Article 9, we
have seen an increase in value of business enterprises attributable to
intangible assets'-the situs of which is less certain-in contrast to
tangible assets-the situs of which is usually objectively perceptible.
The increased attention to international secured transactions led to
more explicit treatment of such transactions in Revised Article 9. This
article analyzes the results of that attention.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; of counsel, Bingham Dana LLP; S.B.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., New York University. Professor Cohen was a
member of the Article 9 Drafting Committee and currently serves as the Reporter for Revised
Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code and of the American Law Institute's International
Secured Transactions Project. This article was supported by a Brooklyn Law School summer
research stipend.
** Partner, Bingham Dana LLP; B.A., Yale University; J.D., Harvard Law School. Mr.
Smith was a member of the Article 9 Drafting Committee and is the current Chair of the
Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the American Bar Association's Business Law
Section.
1. In this article, we refer to the 1995 Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Article
9 as "Current Article 9."
2. In this article, we refer to the 1999 Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Article
9 as "Revised Article 9."
3. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL
STATISTICS (1999).
4. The 1962 Official Text was the earliest official text to have been widely adopted by the
states. Prior official texts had been adopted by only 18 states. See Report No. 1 of the
Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC, reprinted in 1 U.L.A. xxxvii (1962).
5. See Karl-Erik Sveiby, Measuring Intangibles and Intellectual Capital-An Emerging
First Standard (last modified Aug. 8, 1999) <http://www.sveiby.com.au/EmergingStandard.html>.
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In Part I, this article examines the treatment of international
secured transactions under Current Article 9. Part II contrasts the
treatment of international transactions under Current Article 9 with
the treatment of international transactions under Revised Article 9,
with particular focus on issues of perfection and priority. Part III
addresses inherent limitations on the applicability of Revised Article
9 to international secured transactions. Finally, Part IV highlights
Revised Article 9's treatment of certain discrete aspects of
international secured transactions that are not addressed in Current
Article 9.
I. TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN
CURRENT ARTICLE 9
Prior to the promulgation of Revised Article 9, the UCC
contained few rules to guide its application to a secured transaction
with international aspects. Rather, those transactions were subject to
the general rules in the Uniform Commercial Code that govern when
more than one jurisdiction is involved.
Two UCC provisions are implicated. First, the applicable law
governing a UCC transaction is generally determined by UCC section
1-105 (whether or not the parties have provided for governing law in
their agreement). Second, the jurisdiction whose law will govern
perfection and priority issues is determined by application of Current
section 9-103. As will be explained in more detail below, party
autonomy is given some leeway in the former cases, but not in the
latter.
A. UCC Section 1-105
UCC section 1-105(1) provides:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or
nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of
such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.
Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to this state.
This provision contains two distinct rules. First, it generally
determines the extent to which parties may, by agreement, choose the
jurisdiction whose law governs their relationship. Second, it provides
which jurisdiction's law will govern in the absence of an effective
choice by the parties.
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In the first situation, which is predominant in most heavily-
lawyered secured transactions, the parties may, with one important
exception relevant to Article 9 transactions, choose the governing law
so long as the transaction bears a "reasonable relation" to the
jurisdiction chosen. This limited grant of party autonomy is consistent
with post-War theories in conflict of laws generally. 6 The Code does
not attempt to define what constitutes a "reasonable relation" or to
set standards for such a determination; rather, it leaves this for
judicial decision guided only by a Comment stating, "Ordinarily the
law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough
portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur or
occurs."7 Accordingly, parties selecting a jurisdiction that has only a
tangential relation to the transaction to provide the governing law
might face some uncertainty as to whether their choice will be given
effect.8 As indicated above, this rule does not distinguish between
transactions in which all of the jurisdictions that the transaction
touches on are states of the United States and those in which one of
the jurisdictions is foreign. Presumably, then, a debtor in the United
States and a secured party in the creditor-friendly jurisdiction of
Draconia could agree that Draconian law, rather than Current Article
9, governs their secured transaction.
The exception to this general rule of limited party autonomy for
choosing the law applicable to a secured transaction is stated in UCC
section 1-105(2). That section provides, inter alia, that the parties may
not, by agreement, override the mandatory rules in Current section
9-103 determining which jurisdiction's law governs perfection and
priority issues.9
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186-188 (1971).
7. U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 1.
8. A few states provide for greater certainty in some transactions. See, for example, N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 1998) that provides:
The parties to any contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise, in
consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a transaction covering in
the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, including a transaction
otherwise covered by subsection one of section 1-105 of the uniform commercial code,
may agree that the law of this state shall govern their rights and duties in whole or in
part, whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a reasonable
relation to this state. This section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or
undertaking (a) for labor or personal services, (b) relating to any transaction for
personal, family or household services, or (c) to the extent provided to the contrary in
subsection two of section 1-105 of the uniform commercial code.
9. U.C.C. section 1-105(2) provides, in relevant part:
Where one of the following provisions of this Act specifies the applicable law, that
provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by
the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified:
1999]
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
In the second situation, less common in secured transactions,
where the parties have not selected the governing law in their
contract, UCC section 1-105(1) provides simply that the law of "this
state" (i.e., the forum) governs so long as the transaction bears an
"appropriate relation" to this state. Once again, the rule does not
distinguish between cases in which other possible jurisdictions are
sister states and those in which they are foreign nations.
As is the case with the similar concept of "reasonable relation,"
"appropriate relation" is left undefined. 10 It is important to note what
this provision does not say. It does not say, for example, that the law
of the jurisdiction that bears the most appropriate relation to the
transaction governs. Such a formulation, consistent with conflict of
law doctrines generally," could easily lead to a determination that the
law of a jurisdiction other than the forum governs a transaction. By
requiring only that the transaction bear an appropriate relation to the
forum, though, application of the statute can result in the forum's law
governing even in cases in which the transaction bears a closer
relationship to another state. In the early days of the UCC, when it
was not clear that every state would adopt the Code, this provision of
the UCC made it more possible for the forum state to apply its own
law-that is, the UCC.
As is the case for the rules respecting party autonomy in choice
of governing law, this provision of UCC section 1-105 is subject to the
mandatory rules of section 9-103.
B. Current Section 9-103
While UCC section 1-105 gives parties great autonomy to select
the law governing their secured transaction and gives courts
significant leeway in determining the governing law in the absence of
Perfection provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions. Section 9-103.
10. The Official Comment does provide some guidance, however:
Of course, the Act applies to any transaction which takes place in its entirety in a state
which has enacted the Act. But the mere fact that suit is brought in a state does not
make it appropriate to apply the substantive law of that state. Cases where a relation to
the enacting state is not "appropriate" include, for example, those where the parties
have clearly contracted on the basis of some other law, as where the law of the place of
contracting and the law of the place of contemplated performance are the same and
are contrary to the law under the Code.
Id. § 1-105 cmt. 2.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) ("The rights and duties
of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties ... ").
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such an agreement, there is one critical context in which these general
rules do not apply. That context is, of course, the body of rules that
determine whether a security interest is perfected and the effect of
perfection or nonperfection (including priorities).12 In this context,
there is no party autonomy to choose governing law; rather, Article 9
makes all determinations. 3 Unlike UCC section 1-105, which merely
indicates whether, in the absence of an effective agreement to the
contrary, the law of this jurisdiction applies, Current section 9-103
tells the user which jurisdiction's law applies.
While Current section 9-103 is exceedingly complicated, its basic
rules generally can be divided into two categories-rules applicable to
most types of tangible collateral and rules applicable to most types of
intangible collateral. For tangible collateral-documents, instruments,
letters of credit, and "ordinary goods" 4-perfection and the effect of
perfection or nonperfection are governed by the law of the
jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. 5 This rule, like those in
UCC section 1-105, does not provide for any different treatment
when some aspect of the transaction is foreign.
For intangible collateral-accounts and general intangibles-as
well as mobile goods 16 and chattel paper subject to a nonpossessory
security interest, 17 perfection and the effect of perfection or
nonperfection are governed (with an important exception noted
below18) by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.19
Of course, location is a concept that is hardly self-defining,
particularly in the business context. After all, a business may have
12. See R. § 1-105(2).
13. See id. § 9-103(1)(b). This article cites to sections in "Current" Article 9 as U.C.C.
§ 9-XXX and to provisions in "Revised" Article 9 as R. § 9-XXX. References to "cmt." are to
the Official Comments in both Current Article 9 and in Revised Article 9, as the case may be.
14. "Ordinary goods" are goods other than mobile goods, minerals, and those subject to a
certificate of title. See id. § 9-103(1)(a).
15. See id. § 9-103(1)(b). There is a temporal aspect to this definition as well. Inasmuch as
tangible collateral might move from one jurisdiction to another, it was necessary for section
9-103(1)(b) to provide when the collateral's location was to be taken into account. The answer,
according to section 9-103(1)(b), is "when the last event occurs on which is based the assertion
that the security interest is perfected or unperfected." Analysis and criticism of this rule, which
was added by the 1972 amendments to Article 9, are beyond the scope of this article. See
generally David Frisch, UCC Filings: Changing Circumstances Can Make a Right Filing Wrong,
But Can They Make a Wrong Filing Right?, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1983); Homer Kripke, A
Draftsman's Wishes That He Could Do Things Over Again- UCC Article 9, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1 (1989).
16. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(a).
17. See id. § 9-103(4).
18. See infra text following note 25.
19. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b).
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sites in many states, and, if incorporated, may have been granted its
charter by still another jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the drafters inserted a rule for determining the
debtor's location. Current section 9-103(3)(d) provides:
A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of business if he has
one, at his chief executive office if he has more than one place of
business, otherwise at his residence. If, however, the debtor is a
foreign air carrier under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended, it shall be deemed located at the designated office of the
agent upon whom service of process may be made on behalf of the
foreign air carrier.
While the "chief executive office" provision affords some
guidance, it is by its nature somewhat ambiguous. While many
businesses will have one location that clearly shows its "chief
executive office" status, in other cases, things will not be clear.
Moreover, the location of a company's chief executive office may
change over time, with the moment of its change not clearly
determinable .20
Use of the "chief executive office" test, rather than a test more
closely attuned to the particular transaction, can occasionally lead to
surprising results. For example, consider the case of an engineering
firm with chief executive offices in San Francisco that provides
consulting services to a building contractor in Mississippi on open
account. Not wishing to wait for payment, the engineering firm sells
its claim against the contractor to a local Mississippi factor. Inasmuch
as the claim against the contractor is an account,21 the sale of that
account is within the scope of Article 9.22 Which jurisdiction's law
governs perfection and priority issues arising out of the sale in
Mississippi to a Mississippi factor of the claim against the Mississippi
contractor? The answer is California because the debtor23 is located
there.2 4 Similarly, perfection and priority issues arising from the sale
by a Mississippi engineering firm of a receivable, owed by an Irish
contractor and earned in Ireland, to an Irish factor would be, at least
20. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 640-44 (3d
Cir. 1991).
21. See U.C.C. § 9-106.
22. See id. § 9-102(1)(b).
23. Pursuant to U.C.C. section 9-105(1)(d), the term "debtor" includes the seller of
accounts.
24. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b) (stating that the "law ... of the jurisdiction in which the
debtor is located governs the perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection" of
accounts).
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as far as Article 9 is concerned, governed by the law of Mississippi.25
A variation on the first example, though, leads us to the one
instance in which Current Article 9 contains a rule unique to
international secured transactions. Assume that the engineering firm
has its chief executive office not in San Francisco but, rather, in
Draconia City, the capital of Draconia. Inasmuch as, under Current
section 9-103(3)(d), the engineering firm-the Article 9 debtor-is
located in Draconia, section 9-103(3)(b) would appear to tell us that
the law of Draconia governs the perfection of the factor's interest and
the effect of perfection or nonperfection. Current section 9-103(3)(b),
however, is made subject to section 9-103(3)(c). That paragraph
provides:
If, however, the debtor is located in a jurisdiction which is not a
part of the United States, and which does not provide for
perfection of the security interest by filing or recording in thatjurisdiction, the law of the jurisdiction in the United States in which
the debtor has its major executive office in the United States
governs the perfection and the effect of perfection or non-
perfection of the security interest through filing. In the alternative,
if the debtor is located in a jurisdiction which is not a part of the
United States or Canada and the collateral is accounts or general
intangibles for money due or to become due, the security interest
may be perfected by notification to the account debtor. As used in
this paragraph, "United States" includes its territories and
possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Thus, in this international variation of the example, assuming
that the law of Draconia does not provide for perfection of security
interests by filing or recording, the factor would have two choices. It
could either determine the jurisdiction in the United States in which
the Draconian engineering firm has its "major executive office" in the
United States and file a financing statement there or notify the
Mississippi building contractor.
This choice, however, is not always easy to understand or make.
After all, whatever difficulties there may be at the margins in
determining where a company's chief executive office is located, in
most cases it is relatively easy to observe the top of the corporate
pyramid; whatever their structure, companies tend to have only one
chief executive officer, and the officer's location is usually self-evident
(although this could change in an era of telecommuting and electronic
offices). On the other hand, a company with chief executive offices
25. Of course, in this case there would be a significant question as to whether the UCC
governed at all. See infra Part III.
19991
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
outside the United States can have a variety of types of presence in
the United States.
In some cases, such a company will have an obvious chief United
States office. In other cases, though, a company headquartered
elsewhere might have, for example, no presence in the United States
except for three roughly equal sales offices in three different states. If
those offices are at the same level in the company's organizational
hierarchy, how is one to determine which of the offices is the
company's "major" executive office in the United States? Of course,
in this case the secured party could simply file in all three U.S.
jurisdictions rather than expend effort to determine which one has the
major office. But what if a company has no executive office in the
United States? In the case of the Draconian engineering firm, for
example, it would not at all be surprising if the company had no office
in the United States. Which jurisdiction governs perfection and
priority issues in that case?
In this case, the second sentence of section 9-103(3)(c) saves the
day. Because the collateral is an account, that sentence allows the
secured party to perfect by notifying the Mississippi contractor of the
assignment.
This alternative means of perfection for foreign secured
transactions will not always be so handy, however. For one thing,
receivables financing is often done on a "non-notification" basis; that
is, the account debtor is not told of the security interest.26 This is
typically the case when the security interest secures a loan that the
parties see no reason to publicize, but is also often the case even when
the account or general intangible has been the subject of an outright
sale. It is simply the case that many account debtors are more likely to
pay the party with whom they have done business than they are to
pay a stranger.
Another problem is logistical. It is one thing to notify a few
account debtors when their accounts have been the subject of
individual assignments; it is quite another thing, however, to notify
10,000 account debtors that their accounts have been sold (or used as
collateral).
A third problem is temporal. Even if one can somehow notify
10,000 existing account debtors of the Article 9 debtor, it is
impossible to notify account debtors that do not yet exist (or, more
26. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-103 cmt. 5(a), 9-502 cmt. 1. For the same point in the context of
chattel paper, see the second paragraph of the first comment to UCC section 9-318.
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properly, whose accounts do not yet exist). Yet, in a typical revolving
receivables financing transaction, such a "floating lien" is exactly
what is contemplated by the parties. At best, the secured party in such
a situation would have to monitor constantly to determine when new
accounts come into existence. Moreover, even the secured party who
monitors and notifies new account debtors might find itself with lower
priority than a competing secured party who either notified a new
account debtor earlier or discovered a new United States executive
office of the debtor and filed in that jurisdiction before the first
secured party's notification.
When the Ad Hoc Committee on International Secured
Transactions of the Article 9 Drafting Committee was asked to report
to the Drafting Committee its opinion as to which aspects, if any, of
Current Article 9 needed change in order to more effectively
accommodate international secured transactions, the Committee
reported that the biggest impediment to such transactions in Article 9
was Current section 9-103(3)(c). The Committee reported on many
international transactions that either were made significantly more
expensive as a result of that section or did not occur because of the
uncertainties associated with complying with that section.
II. TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN
REVISED ARTICLE 9
A. Overview
1. General Principles
Revised Article 9 makes no substantial changes to UCC section
1-105.27 Therefore, the rules that determine the ability of parties to a
secured transaction to choose the law governing their transaction
(other than with respect to perfection and priority issues) have not
been changed. Similarly, the rules that determine governing law in the
absence of an agreement between the parties are unchanged.
It should be noted, however, that Article 1 of the Uniform
Commercial Code is in the process of revision. The Article 1 Drafting
Committee has tentatively decided to recommend significant changes
to the rules that are now set out in UCC section 1-105. Those
changes, which, like Current UCC section 1-105, apply to all
27. The cross reference in section 1-105(2) to Current section 9-103 is updated to refer to
Revised sections 9-301 through 9-307.
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transactions (and not just secured transactions), would give parties
significantly more autonomy to select by agreement the law
governing their transaction. In particular, Revised section 1-302
would generally allow parties to a domestic nonconsumer transaction
to choose the law of any state to govern their transaction, whether or
not the transaction bears a relationship to the chosen state. Parties to
international transactions would be given enhanced autonomy as
well. So long as a transaction bears a reasonable relation to a country
other than the United States, Revised section 1-302 would allow the
parties to designate by agreement the law of any country-not limited
to countries to which the transaction bears any relation. 28
Revised Article 9 makes dramatic changes, however, in the rules
governing the determination as to which jurisdiction's laws govern
perfection and priority issues. These changes are, for the most part,
changes that affect all secured transactions-not just those that cross
national borders. Yet, by their nature, these changes will play out in
important ways when they are applied to international transactions.
In addition, the Revised statute contains one rule unique to
international transactions that is designed to replace and improve
upon Current section 9-103(3)(c).
2. Determination of the Law Governing Perfection of a Security
Interest
a. The Unified Single Filing Rule
One of the most important changes in Revised Article 9 is the
adoption of a unified single filing rule. By "single filing," we mean
that dual state and local filings are eliminated in favor of a rule that
requires the filing of only one financing statement, usually at a
statewide office such as that of the secretary of state.29 By "unified,"
we mean that the same rule determines the jurisdiction in which filing
must take place in virtually all cases.
The unified rule is quite simple. With only a few exceptions,30
28. See U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (Sept. 1997 Draft).
29. See R. § 9-501(a)(2). The exceptions to this generalization are financing statements
relating to as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut and fixture filings when the collateral is
goods that are or are to become fixtures, in which case the proper place to file is the office
designated for the filing or recording of a record of a mortgage on the related real property. See
id. § 9-501(a)(1).
30. The exceptions are security interests represented by fixture filings, see id.
§ 9-301(3)(A), security interests in timber to be cut, see id. § 9-301(3)(B), and security interests
in as-extracted collateral, see id. § 9-301(4).
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perfection of nonpossessory security interests by filing is governed by
the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.3' This, of
course, is the rule in Current Article 9 for intangible collateral and
mobile goods.3 2 The innovation in Revised Article 9 is the extension
of the "location of debtor" rule to tangible collateral such as goods.
One efficiency benefit of the new rule is that perfection of a security
interest in goods located in many jurisdictions is governed in a unified
fashion by the law of a single jurisdiction -the jurisdiction in which
the debtor is located. Under Current Article 9, by way of contrast, as
many different laws as there are jurisdictions in which tangible
collateral is located govern perfection of such dispersed collateral,
with the result that filings in many states may be necessary for
perfection.3
Revised section 9-301 does not distinguish between transactions
in which collateral or parties are located in a foreign country and
entirely domestic transactions. In both cases, perfection of a
nonpossessory security interest is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. Yet, as demonstrated
below, this "location of debtor" rule is applied to many international
transactions differently than to domestic transactions.
b. Determining the Location of the Debtor
Revised section 9-307 is quite complex. The residual rule, which
is set forth in Revised section 9-307(b), applies to all cases other than
those described elsewhere in this section. The residual rule provides
that:
(b) [Debtor's location: general rules.] Except as otherwise
provided in this section, the following rules determine a
debtor's location:
(1) A debtor who is an individual is located at the individual's
principal residence.
(2) A debtor that is an organization and has only one place of
business is located at its place of business.
(3) A debtor that is an organization and has more than one
place of business is located at its chief executive office.
This residual rule, which is essentially identical to the location-of-
debtor rules in Current section 9-103(3)(d), is somewhat deceptive,
31. See id. § 9-301(1).
32. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b).
33. See id. § 9-103(1)(b).
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though, in that qualifications and exceptions in the remainder of the
section frequently preempt its application.
The most prominent exception to the residual rule appears in
Revised section 9-307(e). That subsection provides:
(e) [Location of registered organization organized under State
law.] A registered organization that is organized under the law
of a State is located in that State.
A "registered organization," as defined in Revised section
9-102(a)(70), is "an organization organized solely under the law of a
single State or the United States and as to which the State or the
United States must maintain a public record showing the organization
to have been organized." Examples of registered organizations
include domestic corporations, limited liability companies, and
limited partnerships.34 It is important to note that corporations
chartered by foreign governments are not, under this definition,
registered organizations because they are not organized under the
laws of a state.
Thus, for the great bulk of domestic Article 9 debtors, Revised
Article 9 will eliminate all uncertainty as to the jurisdiction whose law
governs perfection. Rather than having to determine which office of a
corporation that does business nationwide is its chief executive office
and monitoring the corporation's activities to detect any changes in
that determination,35 a secured creditor need merely ascertain the
jurisdiction under whose laws the debtor incorporated. This can be
ascertained with certainty, without the need for judgment calls that
often accompany a determination of the chief executive office.
Because a registered organization must be chartered by a state or
the United States, though, this certainty-enhancing exception to the
residual rule does not apply to foreign debtors. Indeed, when the
collateral is goods located in the United States, Revised Article 9 may
actually decrease certainty. Under Current Article 9, the jurisdiction
in which the goods are located governs the perfection of a security
interest in those goods without regard to the location of the debtor.36
Thus, when a debtor incorporated under the law of the Cayman
Islands, with a small office there but major offices in Jamaica and
Florida, grants a security interest in goods located in Illinois, Current
Article 9 tells us that perfection of that security interest is governed
34. See R. § 9-102 cmt. 11.
35. For difficulties in this regard under current law, see, for example, Mellon Bank, N.A. v.
Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 640-44 (3d Cir. 1991).
36. See U.C.C. § 9-103(b).
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by the law of Illinois. This answer can be reached with little
investigative cost and carries virtually no ambiguity. Revised Article
9, on the other hand, requires the secured party to ascertain the
location of the debtor.37 Because the debtor does not qualify as a
registered organization, the residual rule requires a determination of
the location of the debtor's chief executive office. This determination
is accompanied by the same difficulties that are attendant, under
Current Article 9, to transactions in which the collateral is intangible.
If it is determined that the debtor's chief executive office is not in
the United States, a second exception to the residual rule becomes
critically important. Revised section 9-307(c) which, by its nature, is
relevant only when the debtor is not located in the United States
under the residual rule, provides:
(c) [Limitation of applicability of subsection (b).] Subsection (b)
applies only if a debtor's residence, place of business, or chief
executive office, as applicable, is located in a jurisdiction
whose law generally requires information concerning the
existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made
generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system
as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining
priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the
collateral. If subsection (b) does not apply, the debtor is
located in the District of Columbia.
All United States jurisdictions, having adopted Article 9,
generally require information concerning the existence of
nonpossessory security interests to be made generally available in a
filing system as a condition of the secured party's obtaining priority
over lien creditors.38 Thus, the first sentence of this subsection need
only be scrutinized carefully when the debtor is foreign under the
residual test.
If the debtor is a foreign corporation with its chief executive
office outside the United States, subsection (c) requires a careful
determination. 39 If that is the case, the secured party must determine
whether the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office is located
is one "whose law generally requires information concerning the
37. See R. § 9-301(1).
38. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(b), 9-302(1)(a).
39. If either of these two criteria is not met, however, subsection (c) diminishes in
importance. If the debtor's chief executive office is foreign but it is incorporated in the United
States, the debtor is deemed to be located in the state of incorporation. See R. § 9-307(e). If the
debtor is incorporated outside the United States, but its chief executive office is in the United
States, it is deemed located in the state in which its chief executive office is located. See id.
§ 9-307(b)-(c).
1999]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally
available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or
result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a
lien creditor with respect to the collateral." 40
Thus, to apply the rule in subsection (c) in order to determine
how to perfect its security interest as a matter of domestic law, the
debtor must investigate foreign law. Obviously, this increases the
chance of error. Even if the relevant foreign law is accurately
determined, Revised Article 9 requires a judgment call in order to
apply section 9-307(c)-the secured party must decide whether that
law generally requires public filings or the like as a condition of
priority over lien creditors. 41 The qualification inherent in the word
"generally" is an important one. After all, even under Current Article
9, not all nonpossessory security interests must be filed; there are
several temporary perfection and automatic perfection rules for such
interests.42
If it is determined that the jurisdiction of the foreign debtor does
not qualify under the first sentence of Revised section 9-307(c), the
second sentence governs and the debtor is deemed located in the
District of Columbia. This rule, admittedly arbitrary and
counterintuitive,43 provides great ease and certainty by enabling
perfection to occur through filing a financing statement in the United
States. This would appear to be a significant advantage over Current
Article 9. Current section 9-103(3)(c), by way of contrast, requires a
determination of which office of the debtor in the United States (if,
indeed, there are any) is the "major" such office in order to be able to
perfect by filing a domestic financing statement. When the debtor has
no office in the United States, the only alternative provided by that
section is perfection by notification of account debtors.44
40. Id. § 9-307(c).
41. While we are not aware of any jurisdictions for which this judgment call would be
difficult, as many countries reform their secured credit law, such a "close case" is certainly
possible.
42. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-302.
43. After all, most such debtors will not have any connection whatsoever with the District
of Columbia. In this regard, it must be remembered that the location-of-debtor rules in Revised
section 9-307 apply only for the purpose of determining governing law. See R. § 9-307(k); see
also id. § 9-307 cmt. 2.
44. See supra Part I.B for a more detailed analysis of Current section 9-103(3)(c).
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3. Determination of the Law Governing Priority Issues and Other
Effects of Perfection or Nonperfection
Unlike Current Article 9, Revised Article 9 distinguishes in many
cases between the law that governs perfection and the law that
governs the effect of perfection or nonperfection, including priority
issues. The general rule, once again subject to significant exceptions,
is in Revised section 9-301(1): "Except as otherwise provided in this
section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that
jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or
nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral."
Thus, when the general rule applies, the same jurisdiction's law
governs both perfection and its effect.
The major exception to this rule of unified treatment of
perfection and priority issues is found in Revised section 9-301(3).
That subsection provides:
(3) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4), while
negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible
chattel paper is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that
jurisdiction governs:
(A) perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a
fixture filing;
(B) perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut; and
(C) the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority
of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral.
Thus, when the collateral is tangible, priority and effect-of-
perfection issues are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which
the collateral is located. As a result, Revised Article 9 can bring about
a situation in which the law of one jurisdiction (that of the debtor's
deemed location) governs perfection (and accordingly requires filing
to be done there), while the law of another jurisdiction (that of the
collateral's location) governs priority issues and other effects of
perfection or nonperfection.
The purpose of this carefully parsed rule is stated in Official
Comment 7 to Revised section 9-301. The drafters recognized that the
rules governing priority and other effects of perfection and
nonperfection by their nature apply not only to resolve disputes
between competing Article 9 secured parties but also to disputes
between an Article 9 secured party and a lien creditor or other
claimant to the collateral whose interest does not arise through and is
not otherwise governed by Article 9. With this observation in mind,
the drafters believed it inappropriate for Article 9 to provide that the
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law of a jurisdiction other than that where the collateral is located
would determine the relative rights of a person who has a lien on the
collateral under the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is
located.
This rule, eminently sensible in the context of domestic
transactions, may pose some difficulties in the context of international
transactions, however. Let us say, for example, that a debtor
incorporated under the laws of Illinois grants to an Illinois bank a
nonpossessory security interest in goods located in Draconia. By
application of Revised sections 9-301 and 9-307, it is clear that
perfection of this security interest is governed by the law of Illinois;
thus, an Illinois filing will perfect the security interest, and failure to
make such a filing will leave the security interest unperfected.
Revised section 9-301(c), however, tells us that it is the law of
Draconia, rather than the law of Illinois, that determines the bank's
rights as against other claimants to those goods. Yet, under the law of
Draconia, the rules governing priority of the bank's security interest
may be so inextricably tied to what we would consider concepts of
perfection that they cannot easily be separated. 45
B. Application of Revised Article 9 Rules to International Secured
Transactions
The best way, of course, to gain an understanding of the
differences between the application of Revised Article 9 to a
transaction with international aspects and the application of Current
Article 9 to the same transaction is to create a prototypical
transaction with several variations and compare the application to
these variations of the Current and Revised versions of Article 9.
Let us start by imagining Debtor, a company whose income
derives primarily from the sale of inventory. In some cases, the
inventory is sold for cash; in other cases, though, Debtor receives
accounts, chattel paper, or promissory notes (all of which are Article
9 "instruments" but not all of which qualify as negotiable instruments
under UCC section 3-104) in exchange for the inventory. Debtor has
45. The Article 9 Drafting Committee decided to separate the determination of the law
governing the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the law governing priorities from the
determination of the law governing perfection at a meeting some time after the meeting at
which the Ad Hoc Committee on International Secured Transactions made its report and the
Drafting Committee adopted the rules governing such transactions. It is possible that the
Drafting Committee did not consider fully enough the effect of this bifurcation on international
secured transactions. For further analysis of this point, see supra text accompanying note 28.
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borrowed money from Finco, an asset-based lender, secured by a
security interest in Debtor's inventory. As part of a securitization,
Special Purpose Entity ("SPE") purchases accounts from Debtor as
inventory is sold (and subsequently borrows against those accounts
from Moneycenter). Now let us add some geography to these facts
and observe the application of Revised Article 9.
1. Example 1
Assume that Debtor and SPE are organized as Delaware
corporations and each has its chief executive office in New York City.
The inventory of Debtor is located in warehouses in Bayonne, New
Jersey; Oakland, California; Toronto, Ontario; and Tijuana, Mexico.
The buyers of Debtor's inventory (some of whom pay cash, but others
of whom pay with instruments or buy on credit as described above)
are located throughout the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
Instruments and chattel paper received on sale of the inventory by
Debtor are brought to Debtor's fiscal office in Connecticut; when
sold to SPE, they are brought to SPE's office in New York.
a. Inventory
In this example, applying Current Article 9 to the inventory
would lead to the conclusion that perfection and priority are
governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the inventory is
located. 46 Accordingly, perfection of the security interests in inventory
in New Jersey and California would require filing (perhaps dual
central and local) in both of those states, and perfection of the
security interests in inventory in Canada and Mexico 47 would require
doing whatever those jurisdictions require in order to perfect a
security interest in this type of goods. Priority would be governed by
the same jurisdiction.
Revised Article 9 leads to different conclusions. Under Revised
Article 9, perfection of a security interest in goods is governed by the
debtor's location.48 In this case, the debtor, a Delaware corporation, is
located in Delaware. Accordingly, filing of a financing statement in
Delaware would perfect Finco's security interest in the inventory
46. See U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(b).
47. This analysis assumes that the transaction is sufficiently related to a United States
jurisdiction for the application of the UCC. For further analysis of this point, see the discussion
infra Part III.C.
48. See R. § 9-301(1).
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located not only in New Jersey and California but also, to the extent
that Article 9 applies at all,49 in the inventory located in Canada and
Mexico.
Revised Article 9 tells us, in addition, that the law governing
priority of Finco's security interest in the various items of inventory is
that of a different jurisdiction than the law governing perfection.
According to Revised section 9-301(3)(C), priority would be
governed by the law of the jurisdictions in which the inventory is
located. Thus, New Jersey and California law, respectively, would
determine Finco's priority with respect to inventory located there,
and Canadian and Mexican law would determine Finco's priority with
respect to the inventory located in those nations. 50
b. Accounts
Applying Current Article 9 to the sale of the accounts from
Debtor to SPE would lead us to the conclusion that perfection of
SPE's interest would be governed by the law of Debtor's location.
Under Current section 9-103(3)(d), that location is the state of New
York. Therefore, SPE should file a financing statement with respect
to the sale of accounts in the appropriate New York filing offices.
Similarly, perfection of Moneycenter's security interest in those
accounts would be governed by New York law because SPE is located
there as well. In both cases, the location of the account debtors is
irrelevant for Article 9 purposes.5
Revised Article 9, once again, leads to different conclusions.
Under Revised Article 9, perfection would once again be governed by
the law of Debtor's location and SPE's location, but in both cases
Revised Article 9 tells us that those parties are located in Delaware,
under whose laws they are incorporated. Thus, SPE and Moneycenter
should file financing statements in Delaware. Again, the location of
the account debtors is irrelevant for Revised Article 9 purposes. In
the case of accounts, in contrast to the situation for tangible
collateral,2 priority will also be determined by the law of the debtor's
49. See id. § 9-401 cmt. 3; see also infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
50. Whether the priority rules of those nations can meaningfully be separated from their
perfection rules, and whether a court in Canada or Mexico would agree to such a bifurcated
approach, are issues discussed at greater length. See infra Part III.D.
51. Of course, if litigation occurs at the location of the foreign account debtors in Canada
or Mexico, Revised Article 9 cannot, by its own force, assure that its rules will be applied by the
foreign forum. See infra text accompanying notes 111-15.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50 (inventory); infra Parts II.B.l.c, II.B.1.d
(chattel paper and promissory notes).
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location.
c. Chattel Paper
Application of Current Article 9 to the sale of chattel paper from
Debtor to SPE depends on whether SPE will take possession of this
paper. If, as is likely, SPE takes possession, Current section 9-103(4)
applies the same rules as those governing security interests in goods.
Thus, so long as the chattel paper is in Connecticut, that state's law
will determine perfection and priority; after the chattel paper is
moved to New York, that state's law takes over.
A similar analysis applies to Moneycenter's security interest in
the chattel paper granted by SPE. Just to make things interesting, let
us assume here that SPE retains possession of the chattel paper. In
that case, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the intangible
collateral rules of Current section 9-103(3). Thus, both perfection and
priority would be governed by the law of New York-the home of
SPE's chief executive office and, thus, under Current Article 9, its
location.53
Not surprisingly, Revised Article 9 provides some different
answers. With respect to SPE's possessory interest in the chattel
paper, though, the answer is the same. Revised section 9-301(2)
provides that "[w]hile collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local
law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or
nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in
that collateral." Thus, Connecticut law would govern both perfection
and priority issues while SPE has possession of the chattel paper in
Connecticut, and New York law would govern thereafter.
With respect to Moneycenter's nonpossessory security interest in
the chattel paper granted by SPE, though, Revised Article 9 differs
from Current Article 9. Perfection would be governed by the law of
the jurisdiction in which SPE is located under the general rule of
Revised section 9-301(1); the exception in section 9-301(2) for
possessory security interests would be inapplicable. As a Delaware
corporation, SPE would be deemed to be located in Delaware. Thus,
in order to perfect its security interest, Moneycenter should file a
53. There is a potential problem here. In a priority dispute between two secured creditors
with a security interest in chattel paper, one of whom perfects by filing and the other of whom
perfects by possession, Current section 9-103(4) seems to tell us that priority of the possessory
security interest in the chattel paper is governed by its location, but that priority of the interest
perfected by filing is governed by the debtor's location. This conflict is resolved in Revised
Article 9. See infra note 54.
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financing statement in Delaware.
Even though Delaware law determines whether Moneycenter's
security interest is perfected, this does not mean that Delaware law
also establishes the effect of that perfection including Moneycenter's
priority. Rather, Revised section 9-301(3)(C) tells us that such issues
are governed by the jurisdiction in which the chattel paper is
located-that is, initially Connecticut, then New York.5 4
d. Promissory Notes
Let us assume that even the nonnegotiable promissory notes
taken by Debtor qualify as instruments under Current and Revised
Article 9.55 The sale of these instruments from Debtor to SPE would
be outside the scope of Current Article 9; according to Current
section 9-102(1)(b), Current Article 9 governs sales of accounts and
chattel paper, but not instruments. Thus, general choice-of-law rules
would determine which jurisdiction's law governs these sales.5 6 The
grant by SPE to Moneycenter of a security interest in those
promissory notes would, however, be within the scope of Current
Article 9. Determination of the jurisdiction whose law governs
perfection and priority issues follows the same rules as security
interests in goods. 7 Thus, the law of the jurisdiction in which the
promissory notes are located-Connecticut or New York-would
govern. Under Current Article 9, of course, a security interest in
instruments may be perfected only by the secured party taking
possession of them.58
Again, Revised Article 9 gives us a different answer. First, the
sale of the promissory notes is governed by Revised Article 9.59
Perfection of SPE's interest, assuming that SPE takes possession of
the promissory notes, is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in
which the promissory notes are located -initially Connecticut and
later New York. Priority and other effects of perfection are governed
by the law of that jurisdiction as well.
54. Thus, unlike Current Article 9, Revised Article 9 provides a coherent answer to the
question of which law governs priority-whether the security interest is perfected by filing or
possession, it is the location of the chattel paper that governs.
55. See U.C.C § 9-105(1)(i); R. § 9-102(a)(47).
56. A good argument can be made that determination of the law that governs the sales of
the Article 9 instruments that are also negotiable instruments under UCC Article 3 would be
determined by application of UCC section 1-105.
57. See U.C.C. § 9-103(1).
58. See id. § 9-304(1).
59. See R. § 9-109(a)(3). "Promissory note" is defined in section 9-102(a)(65).
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The law governing Moneycenter's security interest in the
promissory notes granted by SPE will depend on whether
Moneycenter takes possession of them. If Moneycenter takes
possession, the jurisdiction in which the promissory notes are located
will govern all perfection and priority issues. If, on the other hand,
Moneycenter does not take possession, 6° perfection will be governed
by the law of SPE's location-that is, Delaware. Assuming that
Revised Article 9 is in effect in Delaware, filing a financing statement
there will perfect Moneycenter's security interest. In the case of such
a nonpossessory security interest, though, priorities and other effects
of perfection will be governed by the jurisdiction in which the
promissory notes are located -Connecticut, then New York.
2. Example 2
Let us change the facts of Example 1 slightly by keeping all facts
the same except that both Debtor's and SPE's chief executive offices
are in Toronto. The impact of these changes on the analyses
performed with respect to Example 1 is as follows.
a. Inventory
These changes with respect to the debtor would have no effect
on governing law under Current Article 9. Governing law is
determined on the basis of the locations of the collateral, which have
not changed. Also, the change in location of Debtor's chief executive
office will have no impact on the law governing perfection in Revised
Article 9; when a debtor is a domestic corporation, it is deemed to be
located in the state of its incorporation (here Delaware) without
regard to where the corporation's chief executive office is located.
Finally, these changes in the fact pattern will not change which
jurisdiction's law governs other perfection and priority issues. These
matters will be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the
collateral is located.
b. Accounts
These changes with respect to the accounts would bring about a
different answer as to governing law under Current Article 9.
According to Current section 9-103(3)(b), the law of the jurisdiction
60. Under Revised Article 9, a security interest in instruments may be perfected by filing.
See id. § 9-312(a).
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in which Debtor is located would govern all perfection and priority
issues. Both Debtor and SPE are now located in Ontario because
their chief executive offices are in Toronto. Thus, Canadian law
would govern the perfection of SPE's interest granted by Debtor and
the perfection of Moneycenter's security interest granted by SPE. If,
contrary to fact,61 Canada did not provide for perfection of these
security interests by filing or recordation, the jurisdictions in which
Debtor had its major executive office in the United States would
govern perfection by filing.62
Under Revised Article 9, the fact that the executive offices are
now in Toronto would not change the analysis. Perfection of the
interest granted by Debtor to SPE would be governed by the law of
Debtor's location, which would still be Delaware. Similarly,
perfection of Moneycenter's interest granted by SPE would be
governed by the law of SPE's location-also Delaware.
c. Chattel Paper
Under Current Article 9, perfection of a security interest in
chattel paper varies depending on whether the security interest is
possessory or nonpossessory. Assuming, as we did above, that SPE's
interest is possessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the
same rule as in the case of goods. Thus, wherever SPE takes the
chattel paper, the law of that jurisdiction will govern all perfection
and priority matters. Assuming again that Moneycenter's interest is
nonpossessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the rules in
section 9-103(3). Under Current section 9-103, matters concerning
perfection would now be governed by the law of Ontario-SPE's
location- assuming, of course (as is the case) that Ontario law
provides for the perfection of the security interest by filing or
recordation.
Under Revised Article 9, this change in the chief executive
offices of Debtor and SPE has less effect. In the case of SPE's
possessory security interest, Revised section 9-301(2) tells us that the
jurisdiction in which the chattel paper is located governs perfection
and its effect. Thus, assuming that the change in chief executive
offices does not change where the chattel paper is kept, the location
of the chief executive office of Debtor has no effect on the governing
law. In the case of Moneycenter's nonpossessory security interest, we
61. See the various Canadian Personal Property Security Acts.
62. See U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(c).
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look to SPE's location to determine the law governing perfection of
the security interest. As a registered organization, SPE is deemed
located in its state of incorporation, which is Delaware. Under
Revised section 9-301(1), then, Delaware law governs perfection of
the security interest, as in Example 1. Priority and the effect of
perfection are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the
chattel paper is located, also as in Example 1.
d. Promissory Notes
The sale of the promissory notes from Debtor to SPE would
remain outside the scope of Current Article 9. The security interest
granted by SPE to Moneycenter, though, would be governed by
Current Article 9. Under Current Article 9, issues relating to
perfection and priority of that security interest would be governed by
the location of the promissory notes; the location of the debtor is not
relevant.
Under Revised Article 9, the change of the chief executive office
to Toronto would not change the law governing perfection of the
security interests. In the case of SPE's possessory interest, the
location of the promissory notes will determine the governing law for
both perfection and priority issues. In the case of Moneycenter's
nonpossessory interest, the law of SPE's location-Delaware-will
govern perfection, and the law of the location of the promissory notes
will govern priority.
3. Example 3
Example 3 has the same facts as Example 1 (with the chief
executive offices of Debtor and SPE in New York), but Debtor and
SPE are incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands.
a. Inventory
The jurisdiction in which Debtor is incorporated is not relevant
for perfection and priority issues under Current Article 9. These
matters are governed by the jurisdictions in which the inventory is
located. Under Revised Article 9, on the other hand, this change in
the facts is quite significant. Perfection of a security interest in goods
is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is
located. Since Debtor no longer qualifies as a registered
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organization, 63 our analysis must start with the residual rule in
Revised section 9-307(b). Under that rule, Debtor is deemed to be
located in New York, the location of its chief executive office.
Because none of the exceptions to the residual rule is applicable, New
York law will govern perfection, and a financing statement filed there
will perfect Finco's security interest. Priority and the effect of
perfection will continue to be governed by the jurisdictions in which
the collateral is located.
b. Accounts
Debtor and SPE are located in New York under Current Article
9's chief executive office test. Thus, under Current Article 9, New
York law would govern perfection and priority of the security interest
granted by Debtor to SPE and the security interest granted by SPE to
Moneycenter. Under Revised Article 9, on the other hand, this
change in the facts is quite significant. Perfection of a security interest
in accounts is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the
debtor is located. Since Debtor and SPE are not registered
organizations, 64 our analysis must start with the residual rule in
Revised section 9-307(b). Under that rule, Debtor and SPE are
deemed to be located in New York, the location of their chief
executive offices. Once again, since none of the exceptions to the
residual rule is applicable, New York law will govern perfection, and
a financing statement filed there will perfect the security interests of
SPE and Finco. Priority and the effect of perfection will also be
governed by New York law under the rule of Revised section
9-301(1).
c. Chattel Paper
Under Current Article 9, perfection of a security interest in
chattel paper varies depending on whether the security interest is
possessory or nonpossessory. Assuming again that SPE's interest is
possessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the same choice-
of-law rule as in the case of goods. Thus, wherever SPE takes the
chattel paper, the law of that jurisdiction will govern all perfection
and priority matters. Assuming again that Moneycenter's interest is
nonpossessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the rules in
63. Under Revised section 9-102(a)(70), a registered organization must be chartered by a
state or by the United States.
64. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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section 9-103(3). Under Current section 9-103, matters concerning
perfection would now be governed by the law of New York because,
as the location of SPE's chief executive office, it is deemed to be its
location.
Applying Revised Article 9 to SPE's possessory security interest
in the chattel paper, we note again that the jurisdiction in which the
chattel paper is located governs perfection and its effect. The fact that
Debtor is incorporated in the Cayman Islands has no effect. With
respect to Moneycenter's nonpossessory security interest, Revised
section 9-301(1) tells us to turn to the law of the jurisdiction in which
SPE is located for rules governing perfection. Because SPE is not a
registered organization, the residual rule of Revised section 9-307(b)
is applicable and SPE is deemed to be located in New York. Thus,
filing a financing statement in New York will perfect Moneycenter's
security interest. The priority of that security interest will be
determined under the law of the jurisdiction in which the chattel
paper is located.
d. Promissory Notes
The sale of the promissory notes from Debtor to SPE would
remain outside the scope of Current Article 9. The security interest
granted by SPE to Moneycenter, though, would still be governed by
Current Article 9. Under Current Article 9, issues relating to
perfection and priority of that security interest would be governed by
the location of the promissory notes; the location of the debtor is not
relevant.
Again, the sale of the promissory notes from Debtor to SPE is
governed by Revised Article 9. Perfection and priority of this
possessory interest are governed by the location of the promissory
notes. With respect to Moneycenter's nonpossessory security interest,
perfection is governed by the location of SPE, which is New York.
Priority and other effects of perfection or nonperfection are governed
by the law of the jurisdiction in which the promissory notes are
located.
4. Example 4
For the last two examples, we will move more aspects of the
debtors' operations offshore. First, let us assume that Debtor is a
corporation organized under the laws of the nation of Draconia, a
country without a filing system for security interests, and that Debtor
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has its chief executive office in Draconia. Debtor has some inventory
in Illinois, in which it has granted a security interest to Finco. The
accounts, chattel paper, and promissory notes generated by the sale of
that inventory are sold by Debtor to SPE, a Cayman Island
corporation with chief executive office in New York. SPE borrows
from Moneycenter against those rights to collect from Debtor's
customers.
a. Inventory
Under Current Article 9, Finco's security interest in Debtor's
inventory is governed by the law of Illinois-the location of the
collateral. Under Revised Article 9, though, perfection of that
security interest is governed by the location of the debtor. If the
residual rule of Revised section 9-307(b) applied, Debtor would be
deemed to be located at the location of its chief executive office in
Draconia. The exception in Revised section 9-307(c) overrides the
residual rule, however. Accordingly, because the law of Draconia
does not require information concerning the existence of a
nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a
filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the
security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor
with respect to the collateral, Debtor is deemed, for Revised Article 9
purposes, to be located in the District of Columbia.6 5 Accordingly,
Finco should file a financing statement in the District of Columbia.
Effect of perfection and priority issues with respect to that security
interest are governed by the law of Illinois, the location of the
collateral.
b. Accounts
Under Current Article 9, the law governing SPE's interest in
Debtor's accounts is determined primarily by application of Current
section 9-103(3)(c). First, though, we look to Current section
9-103(3)(b), which tells us that the law of the debtor's location usually
governs. Next, though, Current section 9-103(3)(c) tells us that
because Draconia (the home of Debtor's chief executive office) does
not provide a filing system, SPE's interest is governed by the law of
the jurisdiction in the United States in which Debtor has its major
executive office. If the office in Illinois is Debtor's only "executive
65. See R. § 9-307(c).
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office" in the United States, then, Illinois law will govern perfection
and priority issues. If Debtor has more than one United States
"executive office," though, a determination must be made as to which
one is the major one. SPE would be well-advised to take no chances
and file in each state in which a U.S. office is located. Perfection and
priority issues as to Moneycenter's security interest in the receivables
would be governed by the law of New York, SPE's location under the
chief executive office rule.
Under Revised Article 9, the analysis is, of course, different.
Perfection and priority issues with respect to SPE's interest in
Debtor's accounts are governed by the law of Debtor's location. As
described above, because the law of Draconia does not require
information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security
interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or
registration system as a condition or result of the security interest's
obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the
collateral, Debtor is deemed, for Revised Article 9 purposes, to be
located in the District of Columbia. Thus, SPE should file a financing
statement in the District of Columbia.
For perfection and priority issues with respect to Moneycenter's
interest in the receivables granted by SPE, we turn to the law of the
jurisdiction in which SPE is located. Because SPE's chief executive
office is in New York, it is located there. Accordingly, Moneycenter
should file a financing statement in New York.
c. Chattel Paper
Under Current Article 9, perfection of a security interest in
chattel paper varies depending on whether the security interest is
possessory or nonpossessory. Assuming again that SPE's interest is
possessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the same choice-
of-law rule as in the case of goods. Thus, wherever SPE takes the
chattel paper, the law of that jurisdiction will govern all perfection
and priority matters. Assuming, again, that Moneycenter's interest is
nonpossessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the rules in
section 9-103(3). Under Current section 9-103, matters concerning
perfection would now be governed by the law of New York, which, as
the location of SPE's chief executive office, is deemed to be its
location.
Applying Revised Article 9 to SPE's possessory security interest
in the chattel paper, we note again that the jurisdiction in which the
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chattel paper is located governs perfection and its effect. The fact that
Debtor is incorporated in Draconia and has its chief executive office
there has no effect. With respect to Moneycenter's nonpossessory
security interest granted by SPE, Revised section 9-301(1) tells us to
turn to the law of the jurisdiction in which SPE is located for rules
governing perfection. Because SPE is not a registered organization,
the residual rule of Revised section 9-307(b) is applicable, and SPE is
deemed located in New York. Thus, filing a financing statement in
New York will perfect Moneycenter's security interest. The priority
of that security interest will be determined under the law of the
jurisdiction in which the chattel paper is located.
d. Promissory Notes
The sale of the promissory notes from Debtor to SPE would
remain outside the scope of Current Article 9. The security interest
granted by SPE to Moneycenter, though, would still be governed by
Current Article 9. Under Current Article 9, issues relating to
perfection and priority of that security interest would be governed by
the location of the promissory notes; the location of the debtor is not
relevant.
Again, the sale of the promissory notes from Debtor to SPE is
governed by Revised Article 9. Perfection and priority of this
possessory interest is governed by the location of the promissory
notes. With respect to Moneycenter's nonpossessory security interest,
perfection is governed by the location of SPE, which is New York.
Priority and other effects of perfection or nonperfection are governed
by the law of the jurisdiction in which the promissory notes are
located.
5. Example 5
Example 5 has the same facts as Example 4, except that Draconia
has a filing system for perfection of security interests.
a. Inventory
Under Current Article 9, Finco's security interest in Debtor's
inventory is governed by the law of Illinois-the location of the
collateral. Under Revised Article 9, though, perfection of that
security interest is governed by the location of the debtor. Under the
residual rule of Revised section 9-307(b), Debtor is deemed to be
located at the location of its chief executive office in Draconia.
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Because Draconia has a filing system that complies with Revised
section 9-307(c), District of Columbia law is not invoked. Finco
should file in Draconia to perfect its interest under Revised Article 9.
The priority of that security interest, though, will be governed by the
law of Illinois.
b. Accounts
Under Current Article 9, the law of the location of the debtor-
Draconia-governs perfection and priority rules arising from the
grant of the interest from Debtor to SPE. Because Draconia has a
filing system, this rule of Current sections 9-103(3)(b) and (d) is not
overridden by Current section 9-103(3)(c). Perfection and priority of
the security interest granted by SPE to Moneycenter are governed by
the law of New York-the location of SPE.
Under Revised Article 9, Debtor is again deemed located in
Draconia. Thus, perfection and priority of the interest granted by
Debtor to SPE are governed by the law of Draconia; SPE's interest
should be perfected by filing in Draconia. Perfection and prioriiy of
the security interest granted by SPE to Moneycenter are governed by
the law of the location of SPE-New York.
c. Chattel Paper
Under Current Article 9, perfection of a security interest in
chattel paper varies depending on whether the security interest is
possessory or nonpossessory. Assuming again that SPE's interest is
possessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the same choice-
of-law rule as in the case of goods. Thus, wherever SPE takes the
chattel paper, the law of that jurisdiction will govern all perfection
and priority matters. Assuming, again, that Moneycenter's interest is
nonpossessory, Current section 9-103(4) tells us to apply the rules in
section 9-103(3). Under Current section 9-103, matters concerning
perfection would now be governed by the law of New York, which, as
the location of SPE's chief executive office, is deemed to be its
location.
Applying Revised Article 9 to SPE's possessory security interest
in the chattel paper, we note again that the jurisdiction in which the
chattel paper is located governs perfection and its effect. The fact that
Debtor is incorporated in Draconia and has its chief executive office
there has no effect. With respect to Moneycenter's nonpossessory
security interest granted by SPE, Revised section 9-301(1) tells us to
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turn to the law of the jurisdiction in which SPE is located for rules
governing perfection. Because SPE is not a registered organization,
the residual rule of Revised section 9-307(b) is applicable and SPE is
deemed to be located in New York. Thus, filing a financing statement
in New York will perfect Moneycenter's security interest. The priority
of that security interest will be determined under the law of the
jurisdiction in which the chattel paper is located.
d. Promissory Notes
The sale of the promissory notes from Debtor to SPE would
remain outside the scope of Current Article 9. The security interest
granted by SPE to Moneycenter, though, would still be governed by
Current Article 9. Under Current Article 9, issues relating to
perfection and priority of that security interest would be governed by
the location of the promissory notes; the location of the debtor is not
relevant.
Again, the sale of the promissory notes from Debtor to SPE is
governed by Revised Article 9. Perfection and priority of this
possessory interest is governed by the location of the promissory
notes. With respect to Moneycenter's nonpossessory security interest,
perfection is governed by the location of SPE, which is New York.
Priority and other effects of perfection or nonperfection are governed
by the law of the jurisdiction in which the promissory notes are
located.
III. INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON APPLICABILITY OF REVISED
ARTICLE 9
A. Introduction
Article 9 provides a remarkably complete system for resolving
legal issues concerning secured transactions. Part 3 of Revised Article
9, moreover, unlike its predecessor, provides comprehensive rules for
determining which law governs perfection and priority issues in
multijurisdictional transactions. It would be natural, therefore, for
attorneys to believe that they can ascertain the correct answer to
international secured transaction issues by mastering Article 9 and,
when Article 9 indicates that the law of a foreign jurisdiction governs,
referring to that law. For the reasons described in Part III of this
article, however, that belief, while seductive, would be incorrect. Part
III explores both the limits of the rules provided in Part 3 of Revised
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Article 9 and the inherent limitations on the applicability of those
rules to international secured transactions, particularly with respect to
issues of attachment, rights, and duties of account debtors and other
persons obligated on collateral, perfection, priority, and
enforceability.
As Part III details, there are at least five limitations on the utility
of Revised Article 9's rules for international secured transactions.
First, not all important issues that are likely to arise in an
international secured transaction are governed by the comprehensive
scheme of Part 3 of Revised Article 9. Second, even when the Part 3
rules appear to be applicable by their own terms, it will not always be
clear whether those rules actually apply to a transaction with minimal
relation to a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction. Third, Part 3 rules
sometimes require a bifurcation of foreign legal systems that may be
impossible or unpredictable. Fourth, there is no guarantee that a
foreign forum will apply the Revised Article 9 choice-of-law rules and
substantial reason to doubt that it will do so. Fifth, there is no
guarantee that a foreign forum will enforce the judgment of a United
States court applying Revised Article 9.
The existence of these limitations should not be interpreted as a
failing of Revised Article 9. Indeed, with the exception of the third
limitation (the bifurcation required by the Revised Article), these are
issues that cannot be resolved solely under domestic law. At most,
Article 9 can determine the results under Article 9 for a transaction
with international implications. It cannot determine when Article 9's
rules will be applied in a foreign forum and cannot require a foreign
forum to respect judgments made in the United States by application
of those rules. Thus, the limitations set out below are primarily
inherent in the idea of crafting domestic law to solve transnational
problems.
B. Issues Not Addressed by Part 3 of Revised Article 9
1. Attachment
While Part 3 of Revised Article 9 provides comprehensive rules
for resolving matters of perfection and priority, it is silent as to the
governing law for matters of attachment. Inasmuch as attachment is
one of the elements of perfection,66 it might be argued that the Part 3
rules cover attachment. That argument, however, is refuted by
66. See id. § 9-308(a).
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Official Comment 2 to Revised section 9-301, which explicitly states
that "the law applicable to issues such as attachment, validity,
characterization (e.g., true lease or security interest), and
enforcement is governed by the rules in Section 1-105." Accordingly,
to examine the rules concerning attachment in international secured
transactions, we must be guided by UCC section 1-105.
a. Conflict Between Revised Article 9 and Substantive Law of Foreign
Jurisdiction
Assume that a debtor located in Draconia grants to a secured
party located in Euphoria (a state of the United States that has
enacted Revised Article 9) a security interest in all of the debtor's
assets, wherever located, including after-acquired assets. The security
agreement states that the law governing the security agreement is the
law of Euphoria. Furthermore, assume that value is given, the debtor
has rights in the currently-existing collateral, and the debtor signs the
security agreement, which reasonably describes the collateral.
Certainly, under the substantive rules of Revised Article 9, the
security interest has attached, at least with respect to currently-
existing collateral. 67 But will those attachment rules of Revised
Article 9 be applied to make this determination? After all, the debtor
is not located in a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction. If the goods or other
tangible personal property assets included in the collateral are located
outside of a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction, or if the collateral includes
intangible rights governed by the law of a non-Revised Article 9
jurisdiction, application of the Revised Article 9 attachment rules
may be problematic. This is the case because concepts of property law
and assignability in a non-Revised Article 9 jurisdiction may be
implicated.
Let us assume that Draconia, where the debtor is located, has a
legal culture and tradition very different from that from which
Revised Article 9 emerged. Security interests in personal property are
much more difficult to create under Draconian property law than
under Revised Article 9. Under Draconian law, a security interest in
goods and other tangible personal property must be evidenced by a
physical transfer of possession of the collateral to the secured party as
pledgee. Moreover, accounts and other intangible personal property
assets may not be voluntarily encumbered in bulk but must be
67. See id. § 9-203(a)-(b).
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separately identified. Finally, after-acquired personal property
collateral must be voluntarily encumbered by a separate writing
executed after the collateral has come into existence and the debtor
has rights in it. Since these concepts are property law concepts under
the law of Draconia, parties may not, under Draconian law, contract
out of them merely by choosing the law of another jurisdiction to
govern the conveyance of a security interest.
These obstacles, of course, do not exist in Revised Article 9.
Revised Article 9 permits nonpossessory security interests in goods
and other tangible personal property.6 8 It permits security interests in
personal property in bulk by general description without specific
identification. 69 It does not require, for the security interest to attach
to after-acquired personal property assets, a separate writing at the
time that the assets come into existence and the debtor acquires rights
in the assets.70
Likewise, we might imagine that, under the law of Draconia,
account debtors and other persons obligated on collateral are free to
negotiate restrictions on assignments to rights to payment. We might
also imagine that clauses or rules of law prohibiting the encumbering
of leasehold interests in goods or licensee interests in intellectual
property licenses are strictly enforced under Draconian law.
Revised Article 9, however, overrides antiassignment clauses on
contractual rights to payment and also permits a security interest to
attach in a debtor's leasehold in goods or licensee interest in
intellectual property, notwithstanding an antiassignment clause in the
lease or license agreement and notwithstanding a rule of state law in
the Revised Article 9 jurisdiction preventing the security interest
from attaching.71
b. Possible Limitations of Revised Article 9
If, at any point, it must be determined if the secured party's
security interest in any of the assets has attached, it will be important
to know if the Revised Article 9 attachment rules govern. This
question could be critical either because attachment is an element of
perfection (as is the case in the United States under Article 9) or
because the dispute is solely between the debtor and secured party. In
68. See id. § 9-205.
69. See id. § 9-108.
70. See id. § 9-204.
71. See id. §§ 9-406(d), (f), 9-407, 9-408(a), (d).
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any event, if the attachment dispute implicates any of the property
law and assignability concepts of Draconian law that differ from those
of Revised Article 9, determining the applicability of Revised Article
9 is critical. While the parties contracted, in the security agreement,
that the law of Euphoria would govern-and that choice likely fulfills
the requirement of UCC section 1-105 that the transaction bear a
reasonable relation to the jurisdiction chosen in light of the secured
party's presence there-one should not be overconfident that the law
of Euphoria will definitely resolve these matters. Indeed, the answer
may depend on whether the forum that resolves the dispute is in
Draconia or Euphoria.
(1) Foreign Forum
There is a significant likelihood that if the court hearing the
attachment dispute is in Draconia, application of Article 9 might be
limited. First, a Draconian court, applying its own choice-of-law rules,
might view its property law rules as mandatory law and, therefore,
not avoidable by a contractual choice of a different jurisdiction's
law.72 This view might be understandable with respect to goods or
other tangible personal property physically situated in Draconia. The
Draconian court, viewing tangible personal property within its
jurisdiction, may well conclude that conveyances of goods and other
tangible personal property situated in Draconia must be
accomplished under Draconian law. If the Draconian court
72. Generally accepted international choice-of-law rules recognize circumstances in which
a forum state need not apply the law of the contract if to do so would lead to a result contrary to
a fundamental public policy of the forum state. See Convention of the Organization of
American States on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, Mar. 17, 1994, art. 11, 33
I.L.M. 733, 734 [hereinafter OAS Convention] ("Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding articles, the provisions of the law of the forum shall necessarily be applied when they
are mandatory requirements."); id. at art. 18 ("Application of the law designated by this
Convention may only be excluded when it is manifestly contrary to the public order of the
forum."); Council Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 80/934, art. 7,
1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 2 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome] (mandatory rules); id. at art. 16 (ordre
public); Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing, 30th Sess., art. 32, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.102 (1999) [hereinafter Draft UNCITRAL Receivables Convention]
(mandatory rules); id. at art. 33 (public policy); INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 1.4 (1994)
[hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES] ("Nothing in these Principles shall restrict the
application of mandatory rules ... which are applicable in accordance with the relevant rules of
private international law."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b)
(1971) ("The law of the state chosen by the parties .. . will be applied ... unless ... the law of
the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which,
under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties.").
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determines that application of its property law is mandatory in this
situation, the court would likely hold invalid the grant of a
nonpossessory security interest, the grant of a security interest in
bulk, and the security interest in after-acquired assets for which a
subsequent separate writing is lacking.
Even if the Draconian court does not view Draconian property
law as having mandatory application to property in Draconia, it might
nonetheless apply that law to the grant of the security interest despite
the contractual choice of Euphorian law. After all, the choice-of-law
principles in Draconia may not allow as much party autonomy in
selecting governing law as is allowed by UCC section 1-105.
Assuming that the Draconian court would find that the debtor is
located in Draconia,73 it may apply Draconian property law principles
to conveyances by the debtor on the theory that the location of the
secured party is insufficient to permit that location's law to be
contractually selected. Thus, it may apply those principles not only to
goods and other tangible personal property situated in Draconia but
also to assets for which a situs might be difficult to determine, such as
goods in transit, mobile goods, or intangible assets.
Applicability of the rules in Revised Article 9 that would
override assignability restrictions between account debtors and the
Draconian debtor is even more problematic. Even choice-of-law rules
respecting party autonomy and, thus, giving effect to contractual
selection of governing law do not fully resolve this issue; after all, the
account debtors were not party to the security agreement that chose
the law of Euphoria. Thus, the Draconian court might not apply
Revised Article 9 to override the assignability restrictions that are
enforceable under Draconian law. That would be particularly likely
where, for example, the lease or license agreement creating this
collateral is governed by the law of Draconia 4 or where the
73. The issue of the location of a debtor that is a corporation or other legal entity, of
course, may not in and of itself be easy to determine. The court might look to the jurisdiction of
the debtor's legal organization, of its chief executive or other center of its activities, or of its
registered office. Even the jurisdiction of its chief executive office or other center of activities
may be subject to factual dispute. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International
Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 696, 704-25 (1999) (discussing
the difficulties of determining a debtor's "home country" among countries seeking international
cooperation in the bankruptcy cases of multinational companies).
74. Under widely accepted international choice-of-law principles, parties have significant
latitude to choose the law to govern their contractual relationships with each other. See OAS
Convention, supra note 72, art. 7 (stating that "[t]he contract shall be governed by the law
chosen by the parties"); Treaty of Rome, supra note 72, art. 3(1) (stating that "[a] contract shall
be governed by the law chosen by the parties"); UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 72, art. 1.1
(stating that "[t]he parties are free to enter into a contract and determine its content");
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Draconian court viewed freedom of contract to create such
restrictions as a paramount public policy of Draconia.75
Of course, there may well be circumstances in which Revised
Article 9's invalidation of the antiassignment clause of the lease or
license agreement may be respected by the Draconian court. For
example, the lease or license agreement may be governed by the law
of a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction. This may be the case because
Draconia's choice-of-law rules lead to that conclusion or because the
parties to the lease or license agreement selected that law to govern
their contract. Under its own choice-of-law principles, the Draconian
court might, absent a public policy concern, apply the law of the
Revised Article 9 jurisdiction chosen by the parties to the question of
whether the antiassignment clause is enforceable. In any event, if,
under Draconian conflicts rules, the lease or license agreement would
be governed by the law of a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction and
Draconian public policy is not such so as to override that law, then
the Draconian court would look to Revised Article 9 and likely
conclude that the security interest in the accounts attached
notwithstanding the antiassignment clause in the lease or license
agreement.
Still, there is some cause for concern. The rendering ineffective
of an antiassignment clause would in many countries be considered as
unusual and contrary to widely respected views of freedom of
contract.76 While it would seem likely that a Draconian court would
merely apply the law of the contract to determine whether the
antiassignment clause is effective, a secured party relying on the
application of Revised Article 9 in a foreign forum to render
ineffective an antiassignment clause may wish to proceed with
caution.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 186 (stating that "[i]ssues in contract are
determined by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with the rule of § 187"); id. § 187(1)
(stating that "[tihe law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue"). Presumably, the enforceability of a
restriction on assignment would, as an initial matter at least, be governed by the law chosen by
the parties to govern their contract. This is the tentative conclusion of the Working Group on
International Contract Practices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL"). See Draft UNCITRAL Receivables Convention, supra note 72, art. 30.
75. See supra note 73.
76. The extent to which an antiassignment clause should be rendered ineffective in the
context of receivables financing has been hotly debated by the Working Group dealing with the
Draft UNCITRAL Receivables Convention. See Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal
Regime for Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL's Contribution, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
315, 330-32 (1998).
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(2) Revised Article 9 Forum
There may even be limits to the application of Revised Article 9
to the attachment of the secured party's security interest if the dispute
is heard in the courts of Euphoria. Although UCC section 1-105
would seem to provide the court in Euphoria with a sufficient legal
basis to apply Revised Article 9 to allow a security interest to attach,
the history of choice-of-law decisions concerning cases under the
UCC suggests that section 1-105 is often given less-than-robust effect
even by American courts. Indeed, an American court may pause
before giving effect to a choice-of-law clause designating the law of
Euphoria where the security agreement encompasses goods or other
tangible personal property assets situated in Draconia or, if the court
views the debtor itself as located in Draconia, assets, such as goods in
transit, mobile goods, or intangible assets, whose situs is difficult to
determine. In these cases, the Euphorian court may be reluctant to
apply Revised Article 9 attachment rules. Instead, as a matter of
international comity77 and non-UCC choice-of-law principles, equities
may be viewed by the Revised Article 9 court to favor deference to
Draconian law for determining the attachment of a security interest in
these assets.7 8
Moreover, in addressing the issue of assignability of accounts and
other intangible assets, the court in Euphoria may be even more
likely to apply non-UCC choice-of-law rules.79 As noted above, 80 UCC
77. The often cited definition of "comity" is "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164
(1895); see also In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
78. Choice-of-law rules outside of the UCC would typically require an analysis of the
jurisdiction that has the "most significant relationship" to the parties, the collateral, and the
security interest itself in order to determine which law governs the validity of a grant of a
security interest in a chattel. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6(2)(c),
251(1).
79. The possibility of a Revised Article 9 court applying non-UCC choice-of-law principles
to determine the enforceability of an assignment restriction in a contract is recognized in
Official Comment 3 to Revised section 9-401. That Official Comment uses the example of a
debtor in State X entering into a contract with an account debtor in State Y. The contract is
governed by the law of State Y. In the example, State X has adopted Revised Article 9, but
State Y has not. The Official Comment states:
This Article does not provide a specific answer to the question of which State's law
applies to the restriction on assignment in the example. However, assuming that under
non-UCC choice-of-law principles the effectiveness of the restriction would be
governed by the law of State Y, which governs the ... agreement, the fact that State
X's Article 9 governs the secured transaction between [the secured party] and [the
debtor] would not override the otherwise applicable law governing the agreement.
80. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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principles of party autonomy in choice-of-law matters are less
applicable when the issue, such as restrictions on assignment, has an
impact on parties that did not participate in the choice of law. Rather,
the court might look to Draconian law on the issue of assignability in
the event that the lease or license agreement is, by agreement of its
parties, governed by Draconian law.81 It might also look to Draconian
law if the account debtor or person obligated on the collateral was
located in Draconia and the court felt that it should defer to
Draconia's paramount public policy on matters relating to permitted
restrictions on assignability.8 2
Absent paramount public policy considerations, though, if the
parties to the lease or license agreement chose the law of a Revised
Article 9 jurisdiction to govern it and that choice of law is effective
under UCC section 1-105 or other applicable law, the Euphorian
court would likely apply Revised Article 9 to render the
antiassignment clause ineffective and thus to permit the security
interest to attach.
2. Rights and Duties of Account Debtors and Other Obligors
a. Conflict Between Revised Article 9 and Substantive Law of Foreign
Jurisdiction
Concerns also arise with respect to the rights and duties of
account debtors and other persons obligated on collateral. The
secured party may be assuming that the rights of and duties to the
secured party of each account debtor or other obligated person are as
set forth in Part 4 of Revised Article 9. This may not be the case,
though, if the account debtor or other person obligated on collateral
is not in a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction or if the relevant rights and
duties of the account debtor or other person are governed by the law
of a non-Revised Article 9 jurisdiction.
Let us revisit Draconia. We might imagine that under Draconian
law an account debtor on an account owed to the debtor need not
follow a notice of assignment and payment instruction from a secured
party if the contract between the debtor and the account debtor
giving rise to the account prohibits assignment. Draconian law might
also provide that, if a security interest in an account is created by the
debtor, the secured party is affirmatively liable to the account debtor
81. See supra note 74.
82. See supra note 72.
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for the debtor's nonperformance of the contract with the account
debtor.
Revised Article 9, of course, produces a different result. The
antiassignment clause is ineffective under Revised Article 9,83 and the
account debtor must follow the notice of assignment and payment
instruction to be discharged. 84 Moreover, the secured party is not
liable for the debtor's nonperformance under the debtor's contract
with the account debtor.85
b. Possible Limitations on the Application of Revised Article 9
(1) Foreign Forum
If a dispute arises in a Draconian court concerning the account
debtor's rights and obligations, the applicability of Revised Article 9
may be limited. As discussed above in the context of attachment, if
the contract under which the account debtor's obligation arises is
governed by the law of Draconia, the Draconian court, by applying its
choice-of-law rules, may give effect to Draconian substantive law.86 If
so, the account debtor would be able to ignore the notice of
assignment and payment instruction or, if the debtor did not perform,
bring an action against the secured party for the debtor's
nonperformance. Similarly, even if the contract between the debtor
and the account debtor states that it is governed by the law of a
Revised Article 9 jurisdiction, the Draconian court might view both
freedom of contract to restrict assignability and account debtor
protection as paramount public policies of Draconia and apply
Draconian substantive law notwithstanding the contractual choice of
law.87
(2) Revised Article 9 Forum
The applicability of Revised Article 9 rules may not even be
certain if the matter is heard in the courts of a jurisdiction such as
Euphoria that has enacted Revised Article 9. In the absence of the
firm rules in Part 3 of Revised Article 9, the court, guided only
vaguely by UCC section 1-105, might look to Draconian law for the
83. See R. § 9-406(d).
84. See id. § 9-406(a).
85. See id. §§ 9-402, 9-405(a)-(b). Revised Article 9 does provide for exceptions in
consumer transactions. See id. § 9-405(c)-(d).
86. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
87. See supra note 72.
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rules governing those matters affecting the account debtor if the
underlying contract between the debtor and the account debtor states
that it is governed by Draconian law.88 Alternatively, the court might
defer to Draconia's paramount public policy on issues of freedom of
contract regarding restrictions on assignability and account debtor
protection. 89 The Euphorian court should, however, absent deference
to any paramount public policy of Draconia, apply Revised Article 9
if the contract between the debtor and the account debtor is stated to
be governed by the law of a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction.
3. Enforcement of the Security Interest After Default
Another area of uncertainty with respect to international secured
transactions concerns enforcement of the security interest after the
debtor's default. Once again, the detailed rules of Part 3 of Revised
Article 9 do not apply here. Yet, this is an area of critical importance,
for the value of a secured transaction as compared to the extension of
unsecured debt is in the ability of the secured party to enforce its
rights upon default. A secured party who cannot be certain that the
full panoply of rights given to secured parties in Part 6 of Revised
Article 9 will be available will price its transaction accordingly.
a. Conflict Between Revised Article 9 and Substantive Law of Foreign
Jurisdiction
Let us assume that the security agreement in question states that
it is governed by the law of Euphoria-a jurisdiction that has enacted
Revised Article 9 and the transaction, as required by UCC section
1-105, bears a "reasonable relation" to Euphoria-perhaps because
the secured party is located there.
What if the debtor is not located in Euphoria, though?
Alternatively, what are the secured party's rights if the goods or other
tangible personal property included in the collateral are located
outside of a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction, or if the collateral includes
intangible rights governed by the law of a non-Revised Article 9
jurisdiction? Will the secured party have access to all of the rights
given to secured parties by Part 6 of Revised Article 9? Will the
debtor have the protections afforded by that Part?
Revised Article 9, we know, provides certain rights to the
88. See supra note 74.
89. See supra note 72.
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secured party. Antiassignment clauses relating to rights to payment
are ineffective to prevent enforcement of a security interest in a right
to payment. 9° Self-help repossession remedies are permitted,91
nonjudicial foreclosure sales are permitted,92 and the secured party
may, subject to certain protections of the debtor and third parties,
retain collateral in partial satisfaction of the secured debt.93 Revised
Article 9 also contains important debtor protections, however,
including the right to notice at various points in the enforcement
process and the right to assure that all aspects of the disposition of
collateral are commercially reasonable.
Under the law of Draconia, we might imagine by way of contrast,
antiassignment clauses are strictly enforced, self-help repossession
remedies are prohibited, only judicial foreclosure sales are permitted,
and the secured party may not retain, even with the consent or
acquiescence of the debtor, collateral in partial satisfaction of the
secured debt.
b. Possible Limitations on the Applicability of Revised Article 9
(1) Accounts
The secured party may wish to collect amounts due from account
debtors directly, rather than seek turnover of those payments from
the debtor. This right, of course, is explicitly granted by Revised
Article 9.94 If the account debtor is located in Draconia, though, the
account debtor may resist paying the secured party directly, especially
if the underlying contract between the debtor and the account debtor
contains an antiassignment clause. It is likely that the analysis of this
issue regarding direct enforcement against the account debtors will
parallel the analysis of attachment and account debtor rights and
obligations, as discussed above, relating to an account containing an
antiassignment clause.95
(2) Tangible Personal Property: Foreign Forum
The secured party might also, however, wish to exercise Revised
90. See R. § 9-406(d).
91. See id. § 9-609. The secured party may, however, proceed to take possession of
collateral without the use of judicial process only if "it proceeds without breach of the peace."
Id. § 9-609(b)(2).
92. See id. §§ 9-610 to 9-619.
93. See id. §§ 9-620 to 9-622.
94. See id. § 9-607.
95. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
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Article 9 self-help repossession remedies relating to tangible personal
property assets located in Draconia, either to sell personal property
assets in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale or, if the debtor consents or
does not object, to retain personal property assets in partial
satisfaction of the secured debt.
A Draconian court, hearing a dispute as to whether the secured
party can exercise these Revised Article 9 remedies, might not apply
Revised Article 9. As in the case of our analysis of attachment, 96 the
Draconian court may view the secured party's remedies as property
law remedies that are mandatory under Draconian law with respect to
tangible personal property in Draconia. If so, it would not defer to the
choice in the security agreement of Euphorian law as the law
governing the secured party's enforcement rights. If the debtor is
found by the Draconian court to be located in Draconia, the court
may use a similar analysis to mandate the application of Draconian
law for enforcement of the security interest against goods in transit,
mobile goods, and intangible assets for which the situs is difficult to
determine. 97 Even if the Draconian court did not determine that the
enforcement scheme for security interests under Draconian law is
mandatory and, therefore, would otherwise give effect to Revised
Article 9 remedies as required by the choice-of-law clause in the
security agreement, it might nevertheless regard some of the
individual Article 9 remedies, such as self-help repossession, as being
contrary to Draconian public policy and therefore unenforceable in
Draconia. 9s
(3) Tangible Personal Property: Revised Article 9 Forum
The application of Revised Article 9 remedies might also be
limited in a court in Euphoria. Even in light of the choice-of-law
clause in the security agreement and the effectiveness granted to such
clauses by UCC section 1-105, the Euphorian court may hesitate to
permit application of Revised Article 9 remedies with respect to
goods in Draconia or with respect to intangibles and other collateral
that is not site-specific if the court views the debtor to be located in
96. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
97. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 254 (1971) (determining the
law governing the enforcement of a security interest in a chattel, requiring a determination of
which jurisdiction has the "most significant relationship to the parties, the chattel and the
security interest").
98. See supra note 72.
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Draconia. 99 As a matter of international comity and non-UCC choice-
of-law rules, the Revised Article 9 court may defer to Draconian law
as the more appropriate law to apply.'0°
Any uncertainty about the applicability of the Revised Article 9
Part 6 rules may cause additional problems for the secured party.
Under Revised Article 9, most buyers at a foreclosure sale are
assured that they are getting good title to the assets they purchase.
This may not be the case, however, under the law of Draconia,
especially if the foreclosure sale follows Revised Article 9 procedures
rather than Draconian procedures. Thus, potential buyers at a
foreclosure sale for assets located in (or repossessed from) Draconia
or for intangible assets owned by the Draconian debtor cannot be
assured that the title of the successful buyer of the assets would be
recognized by a Draconian court. Without that assurance, though,
bidding might be chilled. Not only might this result in a lower price
obtained and a larger, perhaps uncollectible, deficiency, but it also
might not be commercially reasonable under Revised Article 9 itself
for the secured party to proceed in conducting such a foreclosure sale
in these circumstances. 10'
C. Perfection
Unlike issues of attachment, assignability, and enforcement, the
mandatory choice-of-law rules in Part 3 of Revised Article 9 deal
specifically with the law that governs perfection of security interests.
Even so, total reliance on those provisions could be quite risky. For
one thing, the transaction may be so tangentially related to a Revised
Article 9 jurisdiction that the provisions may not be applied even in
the courts of that jurisdiction. Second, the Part 3 provisions require a
court applying them to parse a distinction between rules of
perfection, which may be governed by the laws of one jurisdiction,
and rules of priority, which may be governed by the laws of a
different jurisdiction. 10 2 Such a fine parsing may be impossible or, at
least, difficult to predict in advance with any degree of certainty.
99. See supra Part III.B.l.b(2).
100. See supra note 77.
101. "Every aspect of a disposition of collateral ... must be commercially reasonable." R.
§ 9-610(c). If the secured party proceeds to dispose of collateral in a manner that is not
commercially reasonable, a court may enjoin the secured party from proceeding. See id.
§ 9-625(a). Furthermore, the secured party is liable to the debtor for any damages caused by the
secured party's failure to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner. See id. § 9-625(b).
102. See supra Part II.A.3.
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Third, there is a significant likelihood that, if a dispute concerning
perfection or priority were heard in a foreign forum, that forum
would not apply the choice-of-law rules in Revised Article 9. Fourth,
in some cases, foreign enforcement of a United States judgment may
be denied.
The remainder of Part III closely examines issues of perfection
and priority in the context of international secured transactions.
1. Conflict Between Revised Article 9 and Substantive Law of
Foreign Jurisdiction
Even if it is clear that a security interest has attached, there are
concerns as to whether that security interest is perfected. After all,
while attachment (and its twin concept of enforceability) 10 gives the
security interest value as against the debtor, perfection is necessary to
assure that the security interest also has value as against third parties.
Let us assume once again that the debtor and secured party have
entered into a security agreement that grants the secured party a
security interest in all of the debtor's assets, wherever located,
including after-acquired assets, and that the security interest has
attached. The security agreement may provide that the law of the
secured party's jurisdiction governs, but that choice-of-law clause is
meaningless under Revised Article 9 for issues governed by the
mandatory rules of Part 3.1° Assume also that the secured party will
file a financing statement in the location of the debtor, the jurisdiction
whose law will govern perfection as provided in Part 3, Subpart 1, of
Revised Article 9, in order to perfect its security interest in collateral
(all of which are of the types in which a security interest may be
perfected by filing a financing statement under Part 3, Subpart 2).
In determining where the debtor is deemed to be located,
Revised Article 9 tells us that the debtor, if not organized under the
laws of a "state," 105 may be located in the District of Columbia.1°6 That
would be the case if the debtor, for example, has its chief executive
office in Draconia and Draconia does not have a public filing system
for the perfection of security interests. Thus, if the secured party,
103. See R. § 9-203.
104. See U.C.C. § 1-105(2); R. § 9-301.
105. Revised section 9-102(a)(76) defines the term "State" to exclude a foreign jurisdiction.
As discussed supra text accompanying note 34, a "registered organization," as defined in
Revised section 9-102(a)(70), must be organized under the law of a "State" to be located in that
state for Revised Article 9 choice-of-law purposes. See also R. §§ 9-301(1), 9-307(e).
106. See R. § 9-307(c).
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having investigated Draconian law, determines that no Draconian
filing system exists, it will file a financing statement in the District of
Columbia to perfect its security interest granted by its Draconian
debtor.
The security interest, under Revised Article 9, is perfected in so
much of the collateral as may have a security interest perfected by the
filing of a financing statement. 1 7 But, once again, if the debtor can be
perceived as not actually located in a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction
(despite the location rules of Revised section 9-307), if goods or other
tangible personal property included in the collateral are located
outside of a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction, or where the collateral
includes intangible rights governed by the law of a non-Revised
Article 9 jurisdiction, perfection may be problematic.
Let us continue our comparison with the secured transactions
law of the mythical jurisdiction of Draconia. Under Draconian law a
secured party, to be perfected, must have physical possession of goods
or other tangible personal property collateral as a pledgee. Also,
under Draconian law, a secured party does not have a perfected
security interest in accounts or other intangible collateral unless the
account debtor or other person obligated on the collateral has been
notified of the security interest and has been directed to make
payments to the secured party.
Once again, Revised Article 9 takes a different approach. A
security interest in goods and other tangible personal property
collateral need not be perfected by possession. 0 8 Moreover, Revised
Article 9 does not require for perfection of a security interest in
accounts and similar claims against third parties that the secured
party give notification of the security interest and direction to pay to
account debtors and other persons obligated on the collateral. 109
Rather, perfection of an attached security interest in accounts and
similar collateral would in most instances be achieved by the filing of
a financing statement."0
107. See id. §§ 9-308(a), 9-310.
108. See id. § 9-310.
109. While Part 4 of Revised Article 9 does have provisions dealing with the rights and
duties of account debtors, those provisions do not concern the steps required to be taken by the
secured party to perfect its security interest in any claim that the debtor has against the account
debtor.
110. See R. § 9-310.
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2. Possible Limitations of Revised Article 9
Let us imagine a fairly typical secured transaction. The secured
party has a security interest in the debtor's goods and accounts. The
secured party has taken all steps necessary to perfect under Revised
Article 9 by filing a financing statement in the debtor's location as
determined under Revised section 9-307. The secured party does not
have physical possession of the debtor's goods and has not notified
account debtors of the security interest or provided them with
payment instructions. If a dispute arises concerning whether the
secured party's security interest in the goods and the accounts has
been perfected, Revised Article 9 would appear to provide a positive
answer. As we shall see, though, if any of the parties or the goods
could be seen as located in Draconia, reliance solely on Revised
Article 9 may be problematic.
a. Foreign Forum
What would be the case if a dispute concerning the perfection of
the secured party's security interest in goods located in Draconia
were heard in the courts of Draconia? Under Draconian law, the
security interest is vulnerable to the interest of a lien creditor levying
on the goods if the secured party does not have physical possession of
the goods. In this case, of course, the secured party does not have
physical possession of the goods and, thus, would have an unperfected
security interest under Draconian law. Is it likely that a Draconian
court would apply the perfection rules of Revised Article 9 rather
than those of Draconian law? While the answer obviously depends on
the choice-of-law rules that the Draconian court would be bound to
apply, we suspect that very few countries outside the United States
would apply U.S. law to a security interest in goods located within
their borders."' It is likely that a Draconian court would be
particularly reluctant to apply Revised Article 9's perfection rules if
the result would be to disadvantage local secured creditors who would
be surprised that the debtor's goods were encumbered under
perfection rules of a foreign country that were largely unknown to the
111. The Official Comments to Revised Article 9 warn of Revised Article 9's potential
limitations here. Official Comment 9 to Revised section 9-109 states:
Article 9 will come into play only if the litigation arises in a UCC jurisdiction or if a
foreign choice-of-law rule leads a foreign court to apply the law of a UCC jurisdiction.
For example, if issues concerning a security interest granted by a foreign airline to a
New York bank are litigated overseas, the court may be bound to apply the law of the
debtor's jurisdiction and not New York's Article 9.
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creditors and difficult for them to discover."'
The analysis is similarly problematic if a dispute concerning the
perfection of the secured party's security interest in accounts were
heard in the courts of Draconia. Once again, the security interest in
the accounts is perfected under Revised Article 9 while it is
unperfected under Draconian domestic law. Applying its own choice-
of-law rules, the Draconian court might look to the law of the
debtor's location to determine whether the security interest is
perfected. If that court found that the debtor was located in a
jurisdiction such as Euphoria that has enacted Revised Article 9, the
secured party would prevail; if the court, on the other hand, found
that the debtor was located in Draconia, the interest would be
unperfected. In any event, though, the determination of where the
debtor is located would be based on Draconian rules for that
determination rather than Revised Article 9's rules. In making that
determination, the Draconian court may look to one or a variety of
attributes of the debtor to determine its location. For example, a
debtor incorporated in Euphoria but with its chief executive office in
Draconia might be viewed by the Draconian court to be located in
Draconia although, for purposes of Part 3 of Revised Article 9, the
debtor is viewed to be located in Euphoria., 3 To reverse the facts, a
debtor incorporated in Draconia but with its chief executive office in
Euphoria might be viewed by the Draconian court to be located in
Draconia although, for purposes of Part 3 of Revised Article 9, the
debtor is located in Euphoria." 4
But the Draconian court, applying its own choice-of-law rules to
determine the perfection of the secured party's security interest in the
accounts, might not even look to the law of the debtor's location. It
might, for example, look separately at the law governing each
individual account. Thus, in a secured transaction involving security
interests in a large number of accounts, there may not be a single
body of law governing perfection of the security interests. Rather, the
interest in each account would be accompanied by its own perfection
rules; some accounts might be governed by the law of Draconia,
others by the law of Euphoria, and still others by different nations.
While such a choice-of-law rule is unwieldy and might be surprising to
a practitioner accustomed to Article 9, it is found under the laws of
112. SeeR. § 9-109 cmt. 9.
113. See id. §§ 9-301(1), 9-307(e).
114. See id. §§ 9-301(1), 9-307(b)(3).
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many jurisdictions. If the Draconian court took this approach, looking
to the substantive law of the jurisdiction whose law governs the
account,115 the costs of investigating the substantive law of each
account would in many such instances be prohibitive. Matters are
even more confusing and uncertain if it is not clear what approach the
Draconian court would take.
b. Revised Article 9 Forum
At first glance, it would seem clear that the secured party that
followed Revised Article 9's perfection rules would prevail if the
dispute concerning perfection were heard in the courts of a Revised
Article 9 jurisdiction. Surely, one would think, that court would apply
Revised Article 9's choice-of-law rules to determine perfection. If
those choice-of-law rules would lead to the application of Revised
Article 9's substantive rules for perfection (usually involving filing in
the debtor's location as determined by application of Revised section
9-307), 116 it would appear that a secured party that has complied with
those rules would be found to have a perfected security interest. Yet,
even in this scenario, there is room for uncertainty.
Let us assume that the debtor is incorporated in Draconia and
has its chief executive office there, and the perfection issue arises in a
dispute between a Draconian creditor who has levied upon goods of
the debtor in Draconia and the secured party which, although it has a
major office in Euphoria, is incorporated in Vongoli and has its chief
executive office in Draconia. The Draconian creditor has some
presence in Euphoria, and the secured party has used this nexus to
gain jurisdiction. Revised sections 9-301 and 9-307, by their terms,
seem to tell us that the secured party has a perfected security interest
if and only if it has complied with the perfection rules of the District
of Columbia. Yet, applying that rule would mean that, in a dispute
between a Draconian lien creditor and a Draconian secured creditor
involving goods in Draconia, we should follow the dictates of one
U.S. jurisdiction with minimal contacts with the parties and no
contacts with the disputed goods to apply the perfection rules of a
different U.S. jurisdiction with no contacts with the parties or the
goods.
115. Arguably the Draconian court might look not to the substantive rules but to the choice-
of-law rules of the jurisdiction whose law governs the account. Such an approach, of course,
would increase the risk of renvoi.
116. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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Certainly such an application of the rules in Part 3 of Revised
Article 9 would take the rather ambitious location rules of that Part
to absurd heights. Surely we should not assume that a Revised Article
9 court, if it even heard such a dispute, would blindly apply the
Revised Article 9 choice-of-law and substantive perfection rules to
what would appear to be an entirely Draconian domestic matter.
Especially without a creditor located in a Revised Article 9
jurisdiction to protect, it is almost impossible to imagine what interest
would be served in such a circumstance by application of the Revised
Article 9 choice-of-law and substantive perfection rules-other than
perhaps the unjustified policy of encouraging forum shopping for
Revised Article 9 jurisdictions.
Indeed, it is clear that it was not the intention of the drafters of
Revised Article 9 to apply its choice-of-law rules for perfection and
priority in such a situation. As noted earlier, Official Comment 3 to
Revised section 9-307 states that application of the section assumes
that the transaction in dispute "bears an appropriate relation to the
forum State."'17 If such a relation is absent, states the Comment, "the
forum State's entire UCC, including the choice-of-law provisions in
Article 9 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307), will not apply."
Yet, as professors are fond of reminding their students, the
Comment is not the law. When the revision to UCC Article 1 is
complete, the point will likely be clearer. Proposed Revised section
1-302(e), in its current incarnation, explicitly states that the
mandatory choice-of-law rules of the Uniform Commercial Code,
including those in Part 3 of Revised Article 9, apply only to the extent
that the UCC would govern the transaction." 8
Even before the enactment of Revised Article 1, though, we have
confidence that U.S. courts would reach the same conclusion as the
Comment. One would think that, even in the absence of UCC section
1-105 itself explicitly requiring an "appropriate relation" to the forum
state for the courts of that state to apply its Uniform Commercial
Code, the courts would require such a relation as a matter of non-
UCC choice-of-law principles. Normally, of course, the forum would
follow a statutory directive from its own state on choice of law. 19 It is
well-established, though, that a forum state should not literally apply
117. See also supra Part I.A.
118. See U.C.C. § 1-302 (Draft Sept. 1997).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971). Comment a, in
fact, uses the Uniform Commercial Code as an example of a statute that directs the forum state
on which jurisdiction's law to apply. See id. § 6(1) cmt. a.
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a choice-of-law provision in a statute beyond its intended range,
especially where the result would defeat justified expectations.120 In
guiding a court as to Revised Article 9's intended range, the Official
Comments should be helpful to indicate a statutory intent that there
be an "appropriate relation" to the forum state for the forum state to
apply its Uniform Commercial Code. In fact, a court should be
particularly reticent to apply Revised Article 9's choice-of-law
perfection rules to a transaction entirely involving parties and
property in a foreign jurisdiction where legal relationships and,
therefore, justified expectations differ significantly from those that
would be applicable to domestic parties under Revised Article 9.121
Thus, we are confident that any U.S. courts faced with this issue
before the enactment of Revised Article 1 will come to the correct
conclusion, but explicit statutory authority for that conclusion will be
welcome.
If the dispute has enough contacts with a Revised Article 9
jurisdiction to justify application of its choice-of-law rules, some
caution in relying on those rules may still be appropriate, though.
Consider a priority dispute between a creditor located in Draconia
who, using the Draconian judicial process, has attached or levied
upon goods of the debtor located in Draconia or has garnished an
account owed to the debtor by a Draconian account debtor and a
secured party that has perfected its security interest in the goods and
the account by the filing of a financing statement in the appropriate
jurisdiction under Revised Article 9. Revised Article 9 provides that a
levying creditor has superior rights to an unperfected secured party
but is subordinate to a secured party whose interest was perfected
before the levy. Draconian law, while not so neatly dividing the
analytical steps between perfection and priority, provides for
essentially the same result. Under Revised Article 9, though, the
security interest is perfected (and, therefore, the secured party would
prevail), while under Draconian law the secured party would be
subordinate to the levying creditor.
Although the statutory choice-of-law rule for perfection under
Revised Article 9 would seem to provide that the secured party will
prevail, one could imagine the entreaties to the Revised Article 9
court to ignore the statutory choice-of-law rule for perfection under
Revised Article 9 in favor of international comity and non-Revised
120. See id. § 6(1) cmt. b.
121. See id. § 10 & cmt. d.
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Article 9 choice-of-law rules.
Those entreaties might be deafening in the case of a debtor that,
apart from the deemed location rules of Part 3 of Revised Article 9,
would be viewed by the court to be located in Draconia. The levying
creditor could justifiably ask why a local substantive law in the United
States should govern on the issue of perfection of a Draconian
debtor's goods located in Draconia, or accounts owed by Draconian
account debtors to a Draconian debtor. We think that, so long as the
secured transaction bears an appropriate relation to the Revised
Article 9 forum, that forum should apply the Revised Article 9 rules,
but one may speculate that the court would be troubled, under
principles of international comity and non-Article 9 choice-of-law
rules, by that decision.
Even if we are correct in our conclusion that the Revised Article
9 court should apply the Revised Article 9 rules for perfection in such
a case, however, the secured party should not yet begin to plan its
victory party. Two significant hurdles that the secured party faces
might make such a victory purely Pyrrhic. First, the Revised Article 9
court would have limited ability to enforce in any practical way a
decision awarding priority to the secured party. The goods and
account debtors in question are located in a different country and the
Revised Article 9 court has no jurisdiction over them. While other
jurisdictions in the United States would be bound by the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution 2 2 to enforce that judgment, foreign
courts are not so bound. Indeed, enforcement of U.S. judgments
abroad is a serious problem in many contexts.
Second, even if the Revised Article 9 court concluded that the
secured party's interest is perfected, it must be remembered that the
dispute is not about perfection-it is about priority. In this case, the
dispute is about priority between a secured party with a security
interest perfected under the Revised Article 9 rules and a levying
creditor in Draconia. Revised Article 9, as noted in Part II of this
article, 123 has different choice-of-law rules for priority matters than for
perfection issues.12 4 In the case of goods, for example, priority is
governed by the location of the goods. 125 Thus, in this case Revised
Article 9 tells a court to take the Revised Article 9 determination that
122. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
123. See supra Part II.
124. See generally supra Part II.A.3.
125. See R. §§ 9-301(2) (for possessory security interests), 9-301(3)(C) (for nonpossessory
security interests).
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the secured party is perfected and apply the foreign priority rules in
light of that determination. But, as stated above, Draconia does not
clearly distinguish between perfection and priority. A U.S. court
could easily conclude that Draconian priority law denies priority to
any secured creditor that does not take action in Draconia to gain
priority over a lien creditor and, therefore, deny ultimate victory to
the perfected secured party. This difficulty in separating perfection
rules from priority rules is discussed in greater detail below. 126
In sum, we believe that when the choice-of-law rules governing
perfection point to application of Revised Article 9 perfection rules,
failure to follow those rules is likely to be fatal to the secured party's
claim, but following those rules may not guarantee success.
D. Priority
As noted above, the choice-of-law rules in Revised Article 9
sometimes distinguish between the law governing perfection, which is
generally the law of the debtor's deemed location, and the law
governing priority, which is generally the law of the debtor's deemed
location for intangible collateral such as accounts but the law of the
location of the collateral for tangible collateral such as goods. The
dichotomy between perfection and priority is clear in Article 9 and is
second nature to American commercial lawyers, but not all countries
have such a clear divide between these two related concepts. Thus,
the possibility of divided governance of these two issues regarding a
security interest poses few problems when the jurisdictions involved
are sister states in the United States, but has the potential to become
incoherent when one of the jurisdictions is not a state.
1. Conflict Between Revised Article 9 and Substantive Law of
Foreign Jurisdiction
Let us revisit a priority dispute considered earlier. The dispute is
between a creditor located in Draconia who, using the Draconian
judicial process, has attached or levied upon goods of the debtor
located in Draconia or has garnished an account owed to the debtor
by a Draconian account debtor and a secured party that has perfected
its security interest in the goods and the account by the filing of a
financing statement in the appropriate jurisdiction under Revised
Article 9. Revised Article 9 provides that a levying creditor has
126. See infra Part III.D.2.b.
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superior rights to an unperfected secured party, but is subordinate to
a secured party whose interest was perfected before the levy.
Draconian law, though, does not divide the concepts of perfection
and priority. Under Draconian law, a secured party who takes
physical possession of tangible collateral has priority over another
secured party with a security interest in the same collateral who does
not have possession of it and also has priority over a lien creditor
whose lien arises while the secured party has possession of the
collateral. Similarly, under Draconian law, a secured party who has
notified account debtors of its security interest has priority both over
a competing secured party who has not notified the account debtors
and over a lien creditor.
With this contrast between the two legal systems in mind, it is
clear that, if the Revised Article 9 rules for both perfection and
priority govern the situation, the secured party will prevail. Similarly,
it is clear that if Draconian substantive law applies in toto, the secured
party will lose to the other secured party and to the levying creditor.
Yet, Revised Article 9 tells us that, for the goods at least, neither U.S.
law nor Draconian law tells the entire story.
2. Possible Limitations of Revised Article 9
When the collateral is intangible, 127 Revised Article 9 provides
that the same law that governs perfection governs priority. 28 When,
however, the collateral is tangible, 2 9 Revised Article 9 requires a
court applying it to dissect foreign law to extract its priority rules
separately from its perfection rules. It is certainly possible, if not
likely, that this requirement of differential analysis will not be
followed by foreign courts.
a. Foreign Forum
Let us assume that a Draconian court hears the dispute
concerning the priority, as against the other claimants described
above, of the secured party's security interest in the debtor's goods
situated in Draconia and of the secured party's security interest in
accounts owing to the debtor by Draconian account debtors. Because
127. For these purposes, all types of collateral except negotiable documents, goods,
instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper are "intangible." See R. § 9-301(3).
128. See id. § 9-301(1).
129. By "tangible," we mean negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible
chattel paper. See id. § 9-301(3).
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Draconia does not distinguish between perfection and priority, the
Draconian court would likely reach the same result in the priority
dispute as it did in the perfection dispute as discussed above.
Whichever law the Draconian court would apply to the perfection
issue would be applied to the priority issue as well. More likely than
not, a Draconian court would apply its own law to the priority of
competing claims to tangible collateral located in Draconia. For the
accounts-money owed by Draconians to a Draconian company-the
Draconian court is also likely to apply its own law.
b. Revised Article 9 Forum
In contrast, a court in a jurisdiction such as Euphoria that has
enacted Revised Article 9, should, following the text of Revised
Article 9, at least initially keep the concepts of perfection and priority
separate. But applying that separation to Draconian law may be
easier said than done.
Let us examine the security interest in the goods. The secured
party has filed a financing statement in the District of Columbia, the
deemed location of the Draconian debtor with chief executive offices
in Draconia. Thus, applying the choice-of-law rules in Revised section
9-301, the Euphorian court should conclude that the secured party
has a perfected security interest in those goods. Of course, the
secured party is not seeking a declaratory judgment on the abstract
question of whether its security interest is perfected. Rather, it is
hoping to prevail over a competing party in Draconia.
Revised Article 9 tells the Euphorian court, having determined
that the secured party's security interest in the goods is perfected
under the laws of the District of Columbia, to apply Draconian law to
the question of whether that perfected security interest has priority
over a competing secured party and a levying creditor. But Draconia
has no body of law labeled "priority" that is separate from a body of
law labeled "perfection." What is the Euphorian court to do? The
answer depends, we suppose, on which way the Euphorian court
conceptualizes Draconian law. If the Euphorian court force feeds
Draconian law into the American two-step dance of perfection and
priority, it may conclude that (1) perfection in Draconia requires
possession of goods and (2) a perfected secured party has priority
over a levying creditor. If the Euphorian court declines to bifurcate
Draconian law, however, it may simply conclude that a levying
creditor has priority over a competing party that does not have
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possession of the goods.
If the Euphorian court chooses the first method of
conceptualizing Draconian law (by bifurcating it), Revised Article 9
will result in the secured party having priority. This is the case
because the Euphorian court, having already determined that the
secured party is perfected under the law of the District of Columbia,
will apply Draconian law to conclude that a perfected security interest
has priority over a lien creditor. If, on the other hand, the Euphorian
court chooses the second method of conceptualizing Draconian law, it
will conclude that the lien creditor prevails.
There is no obvious reason for the Euphorian court to pick one
method of conceptualizing Draconian law over the other. Ultimately,
we suggest, though, what the Euphorian court does will have little
import. Inasmuch as the collateral is located in Draconia, the secured
party will be at the mercy of Draconian courts to enforce its interest
and the Draconian courts, not bound to respect the Euphorian
priority determination, 130 are likely to ignore a determination
inconsistent with the result that would have obtained had the dispute
been litigated in Draconia.
With respect to the secured party's security interest in the
accounts, Revised Article 9's command is clearer. Since Revised
Article 9 does not require a U.S. court to distinguish between
perfection rules and priority rules for intangible collateral such as
accounts, a literal application of Revised Article 9 will lead the
Euphorian court to find that the secured party has priority over its
competitors. Once again, though, winning in theory is not what the
secured party seeks; rather, it wants to collect from the account
debtors and have first priority to those receipts. If collecting those
funds requires the cooperation of courts in Draconia, the secured
party might have the same type of difficulty described above.
c. U.S. Bankruptcy Court as Forum
If the court hearing the dispute regarding the secured party's
collateral is not a state court in Euphoria but, rather, a United States
bankruptcy court, there is still more trouble for the secured party. In
a bankruptcy case in which the debtor is the bankruptcy debtor-an
admittedly unlikely event for a debtor with so many contacts in
Draconia-even the statutory basis for applying the perfection and
130. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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priority rules mandated by Revised Article 9 would be less
compelling. The trustee in bankruptcy, of course, has the status under
federal bankruptcy law of a levying creditor on the date of the
commencement of the case.131 That status does not appear to be
limited to the status of a levying creditor in a United States
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the secured party's compliance with the
perfection steps under Revised Article 9, a bankruptcy trustee might
be able to assert the status of a hypothetical Draconian lien creditor
to defeat the secured party's security interest if a Draconian court,
applying its own choice-of-law and priority rules, would permit a
Draconian lien creditor to prevail over a Revised Article 9 secured
party who has not taken the requisite steps to prevail under
Draconian law. 132
Moreover, the bankruptcy court might have another basis to
limit the application of Revised Article 9. That would be the case if
the debtor is a Draconian debtor and a "foreign representative"'33 of
the debtor, appointed in a "foreign proceeding,' 13 4 commences a case
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code ancillary to that proceeding. The
U.S. bankruptcy court has sufficient flexibility to enjoin actions by the
secured party and to order a turnover of collateral to the foreign
representative.'35 In doing so, the court is merely to be "guided" by
"protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice. ' 136
One may speculate to what extent the U.S. bankruptcy court may
view the Revised Article 9 secured party, as a claim holder in the
United States, to be "prejudiced" by the failure of the court to apply
Revised Article 9's aggressive choice-of-law and perfection rules
literally to situations where under non-Revised Article 9 choice-of-
law rules there is no or only a minimal nexus to the Revised Article 9
jurisdiction.
E. Summary
The foregoing discussion leaves us with five general conclusions
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
132. Cf. In re McGee, 196 B.R. 78, 83 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996) (ruling that the trustee
avoided transfer by U.S. debtor of Bahamian property under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(3)
because insufficient steps were taken by the debtor under Bahamian law to perfect the transfer
against a bona fide purchaser of the property).
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(24).
134. See id. § 101(23).
135. See id. § 304(b)(1)-(2).
136. Id. § 304(c)(2).
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relating to Revised Article 9's applicability to international secured
transactions.
First, while a great deal of attention has been paid to the choice-
of-law rules in Part 3 of Revised Article 9, those rules do not govern
all conflict of law issues concerning international secured
transactions. Issues other than perfection and priority will be
governed by the much less precise rules of UCC section 1-105 until
the proposed revisions to Article 1 are enacted.
Second, even when a dispute concerns perfection or priority and
it arises in a Revised Article 9 forum, we cannot be sure that the
forum will invariably apply the choice-of-law rules in Part 3, Subpart
1, of Revised Article 9. Our analysis of the text of Revised Article 9
and the Official Comments makes it clear that the intent of the
choice-of-law rules in Revised Article 9 was only to govern
transactions to which the UCC could properly apply at the threshold.
If, by extreme example, a transaction with a French debtor and a
French secured party concerning a security interest in inventory
located in France or accounts owed by French account debtors was
somehow litigated in a Revised Article 9 forum, the choice-of-law
rules in Revised Article 9 do not take the position, and should not be
interpreted as providing, that the failure of the French secured party
to file a financing statement in the District of Columbia is fatal to the
perfection of the French secured party's security interest in the
inventory or the accounts. Indeed, if there is any doubt as to the
threshold applicability of the UCC to the transaction, the applicability
of Revised Article 9's choice-of-law rules should be similarly
doubtful.
Third, to the extent that Revised Article 9's choice-of-law rules
bifurcate the law governing a dispute, with Revised Article 9
governing perfection but foreign law governing priority, there is a risk
that, while Revised Article 9 itself can be bifurcated into these two
concepts, it may not be possible to do so to the applicable foreign law.
This anomaly may put foreign and Revised Article 9 courts in a
difficult position, possibly resulting in certain cases in which the
choice of law for priority governs the choice of law for perfection as
well.
Fourth, Revised Article 9 cannot predict how a foreign forum
will address basic Revised Article 9 issues, such as attachment, the
rights and duties of account debtors and other obligors on collateral,
enforceability, perfection, and priority. For example, even if Revised
Article 9's choice-of-law rules clearly indicate that Revised Article 9
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governs a particular substantive question such as perfection, Revised
Article 9 does not and could not provide any assurance that a foreign
forum in which the issue of perfection arises, applying its choice-of-
law rules, would also apply Revised Article 9's substantive law rules.
At most, Revised Article 9 can tell us what a Revised Article 9 court
should do. Parties to international transactions must still make an
assessment of foreign substantive and choice-of-law rules in assessing
legal risks in international secured transactions.
Fifth, there will be cases in which a party to an international
secured transaction obtains a judgment in an American court under
Revised Article 9 but will need the assistance of a foreign court to
enforce that judgment. Revised Article 9 provides no particular
assurance that a foreign court will give effect to judgments rendered
by U.S. courts.
IV. DISCRETE PROVISIONS UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9 RELATING
To INTERNATIONAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Revised Article 9 continues from Current Article 9 provisions
applicable to particular international secured transactions. For
example, Revised Article 9 retains the reference to commodity
contracts being traded on a foreign board of trade as being included
within the term "commodity contract."'37 Revised Article 9 also
retains the deemed location rule, for purposes of choice of law for
perfection and priority, of a foreign air carrier under the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended. 13 8
However, Revised Article 9 addresses two international secured
transactions issues not addressed in Current Article 9: the
applicability of Revised Article 9 to a security interest granted by a
foreign government or unit of a foreign government; and, for
purposes of applying Revised Article 9's choice-of-law rules for
perfection and priority, the location of a domestic branch of a foreign
bank. Revised Article 9 also expands the circumstances under which
compliance by a secured party with an international treaty of the
United States will constitute the equivalent of the filing of a financing
statement under Revised Article 9. Each of these provisions is
discussed below.
137. See R. § 9-102(a)(15); U.C.C. § 9-115(b).
138. See R. § 9-307(1)0); U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d).
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A. Security Interest Granted by a Foreign Country or Foreign
Governmental Unit
Revised Article 9 expands its scope beyond Current Article 9 in
relation to security interests granted by foreign governments and
foreign governmental units.
Current Article 9 excludes from its scope "a transfer by a
government or governmental subdivision or agency." 13 9 Accordingly,
where a government or governmental subdivision or agency wishes to
grant a security interest, it would do so under law other than Current
Article 9. Similarly, questions of perfection, priority, and
enforceability relating to that governmental security interest would be
governed by other law. A government or governmental unit or
agency, of course, may be subject to a specific statute dealing with
governmental secured transactions. But, in the absence of a specific
statute, parties to governmental secured transactions are left to non-
UCC security devices. These security devices may be difficult to
ascertain or cumbersome to apply.
Revised Article 9 expands the reach of Article 9 to these
governmental security interests so long as there is no specific statute
dealing with the governmental secured transactions.14 In doing so,
Revised Article 9 fills a gap and avoids the necessity of parties to a
governmental secured transaction turning to non-UCC security
devices.141
But Revised Article 9 goes even further. It literally applies
Revised Article 9 to security interests granted by a foreign
government or foreign governmental unit to the extent that no statute
of the foreign country governs the creation, perfection, priority, or
enforcement of the security interest 42 Accordingly, where no such
statute exists, Revised Article 9 purports to supply one.
139. U.C.C. § 9-104(e).
140. Revised section 9-109(c)(2) expands Revised Article 9's scope to include a security
interest granted by a government or governmental unit located in the forum state. Revised
section 9-109(c)(3) expands Revised Article 9's scope to include a security interest granted by a
government or governmental unit located outside of the forum state. Revised Article 9 applies
to those governmental security interests only "to the extent" that a statute of the relevant
jurisdiction does not "expressly" govern the "creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement" of
the security interest. The term "governmental unit" is defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(45).
141. This "gap filling" was modeled on nonuniform versions of Current section 9-104(e) as
enacted in New York and Massachusetts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-104(e) (1998); N.Y.
U.C.C. LAW § 9-104(e) (McKinney 1998).
142. Revised section 9-109(c) expressly refers to a security interest granted by a foreign
country or by a governmental unit of a foreign country. The term "governmental unit," as
defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(45), expressly includes a foreign governmental unit.
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In view of Revised Article 9's inclusion within its scope of
foreign governmental secured transactions for which an applicable
secured transactions statute is otherwise lacking, we may analyze the
inherent limitations of Revised Article 9's applicability to the security
interest, created by a foreign government or foreign governmental
unit debtor and purportedly within Revised Article 9's scope, exactly
as we have analyzed those limitations for our Draconian debtor in
Part III. The limitations discussed in Part III to the applicability of
Revised Article 9 are equally relevant to the foreign government
debtor or foreign governmental unit debtor. Moreover, the Official
Comments to Revised Article 9 stress, in the case of a foreign
government debtor or foreign governmental unit debtor, the same
caveat that there be an "appropriate relation" to a forum state for
that state to apply its Uniform Commercial Code including Revised
Article 9.143
B. Location of a Domestic Branch of a Foreign Bank
As discussed above, if a multinational debtor is a "registered
organization" that is not organized in a "state," it is generally viewed,
for Revised Article 9 choice-of-law purposes, as located where the
debtor has its chief executive office. 144
But Revised Article 9 provides a major exception from this
general rule where the debtor is a foreign bank branch or agency
located in a "state." In that case, Revised Article 9 treats the branch
or agency as a debtor separate from the foreign bank for choice-of-
law purposes. That separate choice-of-law debtor-i.e., the branch or
agency-is viewed to be located in the state where the branch or
agency is licensed if all of the branches and agencies of that bank are
licensed in that state. 145 If the foreign bank has branches and agencies
in different states then, for Revised Article 9 choice-of-law purposes,
each branch or agency is located in the state that federal law
143. Official Comment 9 to Revised section 9-109 provides:
If a transaction does not bear an appropriate relation to the forum State, then that
State's Article 9 will not apply, regardless of whether the transaction would be
excluded by paragraph (3).
The Official Comment then proceeds to discuss an example of how Revised Article 9 should not
be applied by a New Mexican court hearing a dispute concerning a security interest in
equipment located in Belgium granted by a Belgian governmental unit in favor of a Swiss
secured party.
144. See id. § 9-307(b)(3).
145. See id. § 9-307(i).
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designates as its location 146 or, if federal law permits the branch or
agency to designate its location as that of a particular state, then the
state so designated.1 47 Otherwise, the branch or agency is viewed to be
located, for Revised Article 9 choice-of-law purposes, in the District
of Columbia. 148
The result is that a foreign bank branch or agency located in the
United States may qualify, for Revised Article 9 choice-of-law
purposes, as a separate debtor located in a Revised Article 9
jurisdiction even though Revised Article 9 would otherwise view the
multinational debtor to be located in a foreign jurisdiction.149 In
addition, in some cases a foreign bank branch or agency located in a
state other than the District of Columbia may qualify as a debtor
located in that state even though Revised Article 9 would otherwise
view the entire multinational debtor to be located in the District of
Columbia. 50
The treatment of a foreign bank branch or agency as a separate
debtor for Revised Article 9 choice-of-law purposes is understandable
given the customary use of branches and agencies by foreign banks
outside of their home jurisdictions, their separate regulation and
supervision of their jurisdictions of operation, and their well
established market practices. Foreign banks generally tend to operate
outside of their home jurisdiction through branches and agencies in
contrast to other business entities that more often establish separate
subsidiaries. A foreign bank branch or agency operating in the United
States is, moreover, subject to federal or state banking regulation and
supervision largely as if it were a separate legal entity. In addition,
foreign bank branches and agencies operating in the United States
commonly grant security interests and sell loan obligations in the
interbank loan participation and syndication and securitization
markets with a good deal of local autonomy. To apply the normal
location of the debtor rules of Revised section 9-307(b) to a foreign
bank branch or agency operating in a Revised Article 9 jurisdiction
146. See id. § 9-307(f)(1).
147. See id. § 9-307(f)(2).
148. See id. § 9-307(f)(3).
149. This would be the case if the debtor were a non-bank foreign registered organization
and the chief executive office of the debtor were in a jurisdiction that has a public filing system
for the perfection of security interests. See id. § 9-307(c).
150. This would be the case if the debtor were a non-bank foreign registered organization
and the chief executive office of the debtor were not in a jurisdiction that has a public filing
system for the perfection of security interests. In that case the debtor would be viewed to be
located, for Revised Article 9 choice-of-law purposes, in the District of Columbia. See id.
§ 9-307(c).
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would be contrary to, and would dramatically upset, common
expectations that the local branch or agency is, for all practical
purposes, a separate business operation.
Furthermore, the justification for applying the Revised Article 9
normal location of the debtor rules is lacking in this instance. The
certainty desired as to the debtor's location is obtained through the
branch or agency licensing scheme. An inquiry by a potential secured
party into where a particular branch or agency is licensed should
result in certainty roughly equivalent to that obtained by the secured
party that is considering extending credit to a registered organization
whose location is evidenced as a matter of public record.
Indeed, Revised Article 9's foreign bank branch or agency
location rules create far more certainty than Current Article 9 does
on choice-of-law issues for branches or agencies of foreign banks.
Under Current Article 9, the secured party that is considering
extending credit to a branch or agency of a foreign bank operating in
the United States would need either to ascertain where the foreign
bank's chief executive office in the United States is located in order to
determine the jurisdiction that governs perfection or, alternatively, if
the collateral is accounts or general intangibles for money due or to
become due, to notify account debtors. 151 Revised Article 9 dispenses
with both the factual inquiry needed to ascertain where the chief
executive office in the United States is located and the awkwardness
(and at times impracticality) of notifying account debtors to achieve
perfection. It also avoids the risk that a secured party who, having
determined the debtor's chief executive office in the United States
and having filed to perfect its security interest in that jurisdiction,
would be defeated by an earlier secured party who had earlier
perfected its security interest by notifying account debtors without
the knowledge of the filed secured party.152
This is not, however, to say that the foreign bank branch or
agency choice-of-law location rules in Revised Article 9 are without
risk. Many of the same choice-of-law issues discussed in Part III may
be raised in a perverse way if, for example, the insolvency
administrator of a foreign bank appointed in the jurisdiction of the
bank's foreign head office outside of the United States takes the
position that a security interest in branch or agency assets, especially
151. See U.C.C. § 9-103.
152. Current section 9-103(3)(c) refers only to perfection. Presumably, priority would be
determined by the "first to file or perfect" priority rule of Current section 9-312(5).
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intangible ones, must be perfected under the law of the head office
jurisdiction. Given the nature, however, of foreign branch and agency
operations, together with their separate regulation on a federal or
state level in the United States, such choice-of-law issues would
appear to be likely resolved in deference to Revised Article 9's
foreign branch bank and agency location rules.
C. Compliance with an International Treaty of the United States
Revised Article 9 treats more comprehensively than does
Current Article 9 the status and effect of international treaties to
which the United States is a party. Current Article 9 provides that it
does not apply to certain transactions governed by federal statutes.'53
Revised Article 9 makes clear, however, that federal preemption of
Revised Article 9 includes federal treaty preemption. 154 Moreover,
while Current Article 9 defers to a federal treaty registration or filing
system as a substitute for filing under Current Article 9,155 Revised
Article 9 goes further. It provides that it is equivalent to filing under
Revised Article 9 if the requirements under the treaty are met for a
secured party to obtain priority over a subsequent lien creditor, even
if the federal treaty does not require registration or filing for the
secured party to obtain that priority.15 6 A secured party that complies
with the federal treaty requirements for obtaining priority over a
subsequent lien creditor is also entitled to notice of a foreclosure sale
of its collateral by a competing secured party157 and to notification of
a proposal by a competing secured party to accept collateral in whole
or partial satisfaction of its secured obligations.18
In addition, Revised Article 9 would permit compliance with the
requirements of a federal treaty for priority over a subsequent lien
creditor to be equivalent to a protective filing by a consignor, lessor
or other bailor of goods, or a buyer of a payment intangible or a
153. See U.C.C. § 9-104(a).
154. See R. § 9-109(c)(1).
155. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3)-(4).
156. See R. § 9-311(a)(1)-(b). For example, the treaty could provide for perfection
automatically upon attachment or by some method other than filing or registration. In order for
the method of perfection to provide the same public notice as does filing, however, the Drafting
Committee assumed that whatever method of perfection is established by treaty, the method
would be public and easily discoverable by subsequent parties. See id. §§ 9-310(b)(3),
9-611(c)(3)(C), 9-621(a)(3).
157. See id. § 9-611(c)(3)(C).
158. See id. § 9-621(a)(3).
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promissory note. 15 9
Revised Article 9 also states explicitly what is implicit under
Current Article 9: a federal treaty may require a purchase money
security interest in consumer goods to be perfected under the relevant
treaty provisions even though perfection would otherwise be
automatic under Article 9.16°
CONCLUSION
While not without difficulties, the rules in Revised Article 9
governing international secured transactions represent a significant
improvement over Current Article 9. Revised Article 9 provides
greater certainty in determining how to perfect, from Article 9's
perspective, an international security interest. While the answer to
that question will not resolve all, or even most, issues surrounding
such transactions, even that degree of certainty will enable
transactions to go forward with reduced risk. Nonetheless, Revised
Article 9 does not, and could not, resolve all issues concerning
international transactions. Foreign legal systems and fora are not
sister states with the same approach to these issues as Article 9.
Differing conceptions and degrees of respect for determinations of
other legal systems lead to a degree of uncertainty that should not be
ignored or minimized.
159. See id. § 9-505.
160. See id. § 9-309(1).
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